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THE ROUTINE BOOKING QUESTION 
EXCEPTION TO MIRANDA 
Meghan S. Skeltont 
James G. Connell, I1Itt 
Questions seeking identifYing information often begin the interac-
tion between the police and a suspect. Questions inquiring into an 
individual's name or address are common both when an individual is 
first stopped as well as once a suspect is arrested and booked. 
The police must have a record of a suspect's identity before they 
can jail an individual awaiting arraignment. l Indeed, police depart-
ments must obtain, as mandated by statute, personal information on 
suspects, such as physical descriptions, photographs, and fingerprints, 
for investigative purposes in the crime for which the suspect has been 
arrested, as well as for investigating other crimes.2 This biographical 
data-name, address, age, weight, and physical description-is con-
sidered "routine booking information."3 
Without question, answers to "routine booking questions" can be 
incriminating. If a driver's license and social security card list two dif-
ferent names, the answer to "What is your name?" could be used in a 
prosecution for obstruction of justice, forged documents, or any num-
ber of other crimes. 4 A suspect's statement identifYing his or her ad-
t BA Duke University 1992;JD William and Mary 1995. 
tt BA Florida State University 1993; JD William and Mary 1996. 
1. When the state takes a person into its custody and holds him or her there 
against his or her will, the Constitution imposes upon it a duty to assume 
some responsibility for the person's safety and general well-being. See 
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 307,312-13,315 (1982) (holding that, 
inter alia, food, shelter, and physical safety are liberty interests to which 
each incarcerated or restrained person is entitled under the Due Process 
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments). The state must there-
fore elicit certain information from people it takes into custody in order to 
see to their individual needs and safety. 
2. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 12.80.060 (Michie 1962); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 41-1750 (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-11 (West 2003); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 35-3-4 (2000); IDAHO CODE § 67-3004 (Michie 2001); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 148-76 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-390 (Michie 2004); W. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2-24 (Michie 2004). 
3. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 584, 590-91, 601-02 (1990). 
4. See, e.g., United States v. Alejandro, 118 F.3d 1518, 1521-22 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(finding that possession of multiple birth certificates in different names 
supported conviction of possession of counterfeit birth certificates with in-
tent to transfer them in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a) (2»; United States 
v. Poole, 794 F.2d 462, 464, 466 (9th Cir. 1986) (describing that a federal 
agent discovered the falsity of the defendant's previously given name when 
55 
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dress could be incriminating if the police had recently searched the 
suspect's home and discovered contraband there.5 Giving the police 
an address can help the police establish an element of an offense.6 
Answers to these questions, posed by the police, are testimonial re-
sponses by a suspect that the government may use to prove the case 
against the suspect. 7 If these routine booking questions constitute 
custodial interrogation, the questions trigger the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incriminations and the constitutional require-
ment of giving warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona.9 
Although the admissibility of the answers to these questions has 
been frequently litigated since the early 1970s, no unified approach 
exists. The Supreme Court has weighed in on the issue twice, but has 
not resolved it.lO In one decision, Rhode Island v. Innis, II the Court 
addressed the definition of interrogation and appeared to define in-
terrogation to exclude words and actions that are "normally attendant 
to arrest and custody," despite the fact that routine booking questions 
are indeed direct questions posed by a police officer. 12 
Roughly ten years later, the Supreme Court specifically addressed 
routine booking questions in Pennsylvania v. Muniz. I3 Four justices 
determined that these questions, although custodial interrogation, 
were exempt from Miranda. I4 Some courts, relying on the plurality in 
Muniz or without any analysis, have concluded that routine booking 
questions are simply exempt from the requirements of Miranda. I5 
the agent filled out a booking form used by federal marshals); United 
States v. LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109, 1112 (2d Cir. 1975) ("A person's name, 
age, address, marital status and similar data, while usually non-incrimina-
tory in character, may in a particular context provide the missing link re-
quired to convict."); State v. Love, 717 A.2d 670, 671-72 (Conn. 1998) 
(holding that defendant's possession of differing identification cards sup-
ported conviction of credit card theft). 
5. United States v. Disla, 805 F.2d 1340, 1347 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a 
question regarding a suspect's address related to an element of the of-
fense-possession of cocaine-thus was not routine booking information). 
6. Id. 
7. See Poole, 794 F.2d at 466; LaVallee, 521 F.2d at 1112. 
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself .... " Id. 
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
10. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 
291 (1980). 
11. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
12. Id. at 300-01. 
13. 496 U.S. 582 (1990). 
14. Id. at 601 (Brennan, j., plurality opinion in which O'Connor, Scalia, and 
Kennedy, lJ., joined). 
15. See, e.g., United States v. Shea, 150 F.3d 44, 47-48 (1st Cir. 1998); Presley v. 
Benbrook, 4 F.3d 405, 408 (5th Cir. 1993); State v. Cuesta, 791 A.2d 686, 
693 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); Commonwealth v. Acosta, 627 N.E.2d 466, 468-
69 (Mass. 1993). 
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Almost every jurisdiction in this country has addressed whether Mi-
randa warnings are necessary before a police officer may ask a suspect 
routine booking questions.16 Some courts have concluded that rou-
tine booking questions do not constitute interrogation and therefore 
do not require any warnings.17 Other courts have concluded that the 
questions are interrogation, but are otherwise exempt from Miranda s 
procedural requirements. 18 
The procedures involved in asking these questions are critical to the 
admissibility of the answers. The resolution of whether the privilege 
against self-incrimination applies to these questions is frequently liti-
gated and analyzed, but without consistent results. The Innis defini-
tion of interrogation is open to interpretation. In Innis, the Supreme 
Court explained its definition as encompassing all words or behaviors 
that the police "should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incrimi-
nating response from the suspect."19 Some courts, using the test es-
poused in Innis, find that the police should know that asking booking 
questions will elicit incriminating responses, and have accordingly 
held that the questions amount to interrogation.2o In the same opin-
ion, however, the Supreme Court appeared to state that questions 
"normally attendant to arrest and custody" do not amount to interro-
gation.21 The plurality in Muniz, on the other hand, indicated that 
routine booking questions are covered by a blanket exception to 
Miranda. 22 
This article will examine the law of custodial interrogation as it re-
lates to routine booking questions. After a brief overview of Supreme 
Court cases that form the backbone of other courts' analyses of the 
issue and the emergence of the routine booking question exception 
to Miranda, it will examine the cases that focus on whether routine 
booking questions constitute interrogation. It then examines the dif-
ferent approaches to the routine booking question exception-
whether courts view the questions or circumstances subjectively, objec-
tively, or using both types of analyses. Finally, it concludes that the 
excuse of a routine booking question exception to Miranda can be 
used to broaden custodial interrogations beyond constitutional limits. 
In order to prevent this and allow for police departments to gather 
the basic identification data necessary to administer jails and pre-trial 
services, courts should return to a basic, common-sense approach to 
the routine booking question exception. First, they should require 
that the question be asked during booking rather than in any field 
16. See infra notes 13M7 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra notes 136, 138-40 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text. 
19. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. 
20. See infra notes 122-30 and accompanying text. 
21. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. 
22. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601-02. 
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interview or other investigatory context. Second, they should limit the 
questions that qualify for this exception to those seeking only bio-
graphical data necessary for booking. Third, they should permit ques-
tions to fall within this exception only if they are not reasonably likely 
to lead to an incriminating response. 
I. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION 
A. The Miranda Warnings Requirement 
As with most of the rights and privileges enumerated in the Consti-
tution, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination stems 
from an interest in preventing governmental abuses that were ram-
pant during the Stuart monarchy.23 The privilege against self-incrimi-
nation developed based on the principle that the government must 
respect the "dignity and integrity of its citizens."24 Fundamentally, 
each individual has a due process interest in remaining free from co-
erced confessions, and a confession is admissible against an individual 
only if he or she confesses voluntarily.25 This is a personal right of an 
23. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458-59 (1966); see also Arizona v. 
Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 507 (1978) (tracing the history of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause to a reaction against the power of judges under the Stuart 
monarchs to dismiss a jury if the prosecution had presented insufficient 
evidence with the hopes that a second trial would result in a conviction); 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 253-55 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(explaining that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unu-
sual punishment stems from a desire to end the use of torture and brutality 
common under Stuart monarchs); United States v.Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 
178 (1966) (canvassing the history of the immunity provisions of the 
Speech and Debate clause and concluding that it "was the culmination of a 
long struggle for parliamentary supremacy. Behind these simple phrases 
lies a history of conflict between the Commons and the Tudor and Stuart 
monarchs during which successive monarchs utilized the criminal and civil 
law to suppress and intimidate critical legislators."); James W. Ely, Jr., The 
Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Pro-
cess, 16 CaNST. COMMENT. 315, 320-21 (1999) (outlining the origins of sub-
stantive due process to the Magna Carta, and asserting that the English 
made little use of it until the reign of the Stuarts);Joseph E. Olson & David 
B. Kopel, All the Way Down the Slippery Slope: Gun Prohibition in England and 
Some Lessons for Civil Liberties in America, 22 RAMUNE L. REv. 399, 402-03 
(1999) (explaining that the right to bear arms, form militias, and petition 
the government for the redress of grievances arose just after the Glorious 
Revolution in response to the Stuart monarchs' absolutism and forced dis-
arming of the population). 
24. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 ("[T]o respect the inviolability of the human per-
sonality, our accusatory system' of criminal justice demands that the govern-
ment seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by 
its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of 
compelling it from his own mouth."). 
25. See George C. Thomas III, A Philosophical Account of Coerced Self-Incrimination, 
5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 79, 80, 81-82 (1993) (describing a Kantian, positive 
liberty construction of coercion that rests on whether the individual possi-
bly being coerced has full information-an individual's choice to act may 
be coerced simply because she is uninformed). 
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individual; the Fifth Amendment protects an individual against undue 
compulsion regardless of the intentions of the government officer.26 
To ensure that police respect a suspect's dignity, the Supreme Court 
dictated that, before initiating a custodial interrogation, a police of-
ficer must give the now-familiar warnings that the suspect has the 
right to remain silent, that any statements may be used against him or 
her, that the suspect has the right to consult with counsel and to have 
counsel present at the interrogation, and that the suspect has the 
right to court-appointed counsel if he or she is indigent.27 
Although the Supreme Court stated that these warnings were "an 
absolute prerequisite" to custodial interrogations,28 it has nonetheless 
chipped away at the privilege, finding certain custodial interrogations 
exempt from the requirement that a suspect receive Miranda warnings 
in order to render any statements adinissible.29 For example, the' 
Court has held that a suspect's responses to questions asked in viola-
tion of Miranda may be admitted for impeachment purposes.30 Like-
wise, the Court has carved out a "public safety" exception to the 
requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a defendant's 
statements can be admitted into evidence when "police officers ask 
questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety."31 
The Court has also approved of the admission of confessions that 
came after Miranda warnings, even though the suspect originally con-
fessed prior to receiving any warnings.32 In addition, an incarcerated 
26. See Jonathan L. Marks, Note, Confusing the Fifth Amendment with the Sixth: 
Lower Court Misapplication of the Innis Definition of Interrogation, 87 MICH. L. 
REv. 1073, 1088 (1989) ("It does not matter what police intend if the acts 
cause the individual to be aware of unconstitutional pressures. At the mo-
ment those pressures occur the right is violated."). 
27. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471-73. 
28. Id. at 471. 
29. See infra notes 30-35 and accompanying text. 
30. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971). This impeachment excep-
tion has led to the absurd and unconscionable result that, even when police 
intentionally ignore a suspect's invocation of the right to remain silent or 
the Fifth Amendment right to counsel by continuing to question him or 
her with the specific purpose of extracting impeachment information, 
courts still admit the statements. See People v. Peevy, 953 P.2d 1212 (Cal. 
1998) (holding that the impeachment exception to Miranda applied and 
permitting the admission of statements despite the police officers' admitted 
and intentional misconduct, therefore violating the suspect's Fifth Amend-
ment rights), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1042 (1998); see also Kelly McMurry, Cali-
fornia Supreme Courl Chips Away at Miranda, 34 TRIAL 81 (1998); James L. 
Kainen, The Impeachment Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rules: Policies, Principles, 
and Politics, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1301 (1992). 
31. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984). 
32. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 310-11 (1985). In Elstad, the defendant 
made an incriminating statement prior to receiving Miranda warnings, 
which the state conceded were inadmissible. Id. at 301-02. After the defen-
dant had made these statements, however, the police again questioned 
him, this time after administering the warnings, and the defendant waived 
his right to remain silent and executed a written confession. Id. at 301. 
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suspect's answers to the questions posed by undercover police officers 
masquerading as inmates in a jail may be admitted despite the lack of 
Miranda warnings.33 For each of these exceptions, the Court accepted 
that the questioning arose in the context of a custodial interrogation, 
but concluded that either the policy reasons justifYing the warning 
requirement were absent,34 or the need for the information out-
weighed the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.35 
B. Emergence of the Routine Booking Question Exception 
In the 1970s, courts began recognizing another exception to Mi-
randa: admission of statements suspects made while the police were 
collecting biographical information during the booking process.36 
Most of these cases took the position that inquiries into routine bio-
graphical information used for administrative purposes did not consti-
The Court held that the admitted violation of the defendant's Fifth Amend-
ment rights in the first confession did not taint the second confession. [d. 
at 318. But see Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2608-10 (2004) (holding 
that Miranda warnings administered in the middle of a continuous interro-
gation are ineffective) 
33. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296-98 (1990). The Court stated: "Ploys to 
mislead a suspect or lull him into a false sense of security that do not rise to 
the level of compulsion or coercion to speak are not within Miranda's con-
cerns." [d. at 297. 
34. See Perkins, 496 U.S. at 297-98 (explaining that an incarcerated suspect feels 
no compulsion to confess when bragging to people whom he or she be-
lieves to be other inmates but are actually undercover officers); Elstad, 470 
U.S. at 315-16 (holding that, although the police may have failed to give 
Miranda warnings because of "reluctance to initiate an alarming police pro-
cedure," the elements of coercion were not present at the custodial 
interrogation) . 
35. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655-57 (holding that, despite the fact that the defen-
dant was handcuffed and surrounded by at least four officers, the police 
needed to act spontaneously in order to see to their own safety and the 
safety of others, rather than simply adhering to a police manual); Harris, 
401 U.S. at 225-26 (holding that admitting statements made in violation of 
Miranda to impeach a defendant simply used "the traditional truth-testing 
devices of the adversary process"). 
36. See, e.g., United States v. LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(relying on a draft of the American Law Institute's MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAiGNMENT PROCEDURE § 140.8(5) (Proposed Official Draft 1974), which 
limits the necessity of Miranda warnings to "'questioning designed to inves-
tigate crimes or the involvement of the arrested person or others in crimes' 
as distinguished from 'non-investigatory questioning'''). But see Cavaness v. 
State, 581 P.2d 475, 480 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978) (holding that information 
on administrative forms is admissible only if a defendant has been given 
Miranda warnings at the time of questioning: "In a situation such as this, 
with questioning taking place at the jail during booking, and where the 
questions asked are simply informational, Le., name, age, address, etc., 
then in order for the State to use a defendant's answers against him or her 
the interrogation must be preceded by a warning reasonably contempora-
neous in time"). 
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tute interrogation.37 Many of these courts reasoned that Miranda did 
not apply to booking questions because the police or other investigat-
ing officers were not attempting to elicit incriminating information.38 
Although the courts on the surface applied a bright-line rule that the 
questioning did not amount to interrogation, they justified this con-
clusion from the subjective intent of the police, concluding that Mi-
randa did not apply when the police intentions were not 
investigatory. 39 
Some courts took the approach that questions regarding biographi-
cal information did not call for testimonial responses. The Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that answers to questions regard-
ing aliases or other identifYing information were not testimonial be-
cause "[a]n alias is as much an identifYing characteristic as a 
defendant's voice or handwriting," and because no Miranda warnings 
are necessary to extract handwriting exemplars.40 
This evolving exception was not without its critics. Even courts that 
recognized a booking exception to Miranda acknowledged that the 
37. See LaVallee, 521 F.2d at 1113 ("Accordingly we hold that since the answer 
furnished by Hines to the arresting officer in respect to his inquiry regard-
ing Hines' marital status constituted merely basic identification required 
for booking purposes, its admission was not barred because of the officer's 
failure to satisfy Miranda's warning-waiver procedure."); United States v. La 
Monica, 472 F.2d 580, 581 (9th Cir. 1972) ("[T]he officer[ ] made no effort 
to question him about the contraband ... [and] was not seeking evidence 
but was trying to identify and inventory La Monica's personal effects."); 
Nading v. State, 377 N.E.2d 1345, 1347 (Ind. 1978) ("Routine administra-
tive questioning concerning an arrestee's name and address are usually not 
considered to be part of an 'interrogation."'); State v. Kincaide, 602 P.2d 
307,311 (Or. 1979) ("[A] request for defendant's name after his arrest was 
a question asked for a 'standard administrative purpose' as the first step in 
booking, and hence was not interrogation within the ambit of the Miranda 
rule." (citing State v. Whitlow, 510 P.2d 1354,1357 (Or. Ct. App. 1974»). 
38. See, e.g., La Monica, 472 F.2d at 581; Nading, 377 N.E.2d at 1347; Kincaide, 
602 P.2d at 311. 
39. See, e.g., LaVallee, 521 F.2d at 1112-13; Kincaide, 602 P.2d at 311 (citing Whit-
low, 510 P.2d 1354) (questioning during booking is not interrogation). 
40. United States v. Prewitt, 553 F.2d 1082, 1085-86 (7th Cir. 1977). Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist found this approach persuasive, and thirteen years later, in 
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, concluded that the answers to questions seeking bio-
graphical information were not testimonial. 496 U.S. 582, 608 (Rehnquist, 
o Cj., concurring in part, concurring in the result in part and dissenting in 
part). Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White, Blackmun, and 
Stevens, asserted that a question regarding the date of Muniz's sixth birth-
day was simply a test of Muniz's mental coordination rather than an at-
tempt to elicit testimony. Id. at 607. He asserted that the question was no 
different from the "walk and tum" or "one leg stand" portion of a field 
sobriety test, only that it tested mental acuity rather than physical coordina-
tion. Id. The fact that this particular test required the use of the voice had 
no impact. Id. Nonetheless, Chief Justice Rehnquist accepted as a matter 
of course that, "had the question related only to the date of his birth, it 
presumably would have come under the 'booking exception' to Mi-
randa . .. to which the Court refers elsewhere in its opinion." Id. 
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intent of the police could interfere with the constitutional protections 
that the Court in Miranda intended to provide.41 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit apologized, stating" [w] e recognize that 
this exception to Miranda lends itself to the possibility of abuse by 
police who might, under the guise of seeking pedigree data, elicit an 
incriminating statement. "42 
1. Rhode Island v. Innis43 
In Innis, the Supreme Court for the first time alluded to a routine 
booking question exception, although the Court's focus was on defin-
ing interrogation.44 The Providence, Rhode Island, police began 
searching for Thomas J. Innis after a taxi driver reported that he was 
robbed by a man wielding a sawed-off shotgun.45 The taxi driver de-
scribed his assailant and identified Innis in a photo line-up.46 A pa-
trolman sfotted Innis on the street and arrested him with no 
difficulty.4 At the time of his arrest, Innis was unarmed.48 The pa-
trolman, and then later other officers who arrived at the scene, ad-
vised Innis of his Miranda rights. 49 Innis invoked his right to 
counse1.50 A police captain then instructed the officers to neither 
question Innis nor in any way coerce him to make any statements.51 
While several patrolmen were riding in a car to the police station 
with Innis, they began discussing the missing sawed-off shotgun.52 
One stated that a school for handicapped children was located 
nearby, where many children played in the school yard, and "God for-
bid one of them might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt 
themselves."53 Another officer in the car agreed, stating that "it was a 
safety factor and that [they] should, you know, continue to search for 
the weapon and try to find it."54 The first officer then said that it 
would be too bad if a little girl "would pick up the gun, maybe kill 
41. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 610-11. 
42. LaVallee, 521 F.2d at 1113 n.2; see also Procter v. United States, 404 F.2d 819, 
821 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("The arrested person may, of course, be 'booked' by 
the police. But he is not to be taken to police headquarters in order to 
carry out a process of inquiry that lends itself, even if not so designed, to 
eliciting damaging statements." (quoting Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 
449,454 (1957))). 
43. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
44. Id. 
45. See id. at 293; see also State v. Innis, 391 A.2d 1158, 1160-61 (R.I. 1978). 
46. Innis, 446 U.S. at 293. 
47. Id. at 294. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 294-95 (quoting the testimony of Patrolman Gleckman). 
54. Id. at 295 (quoting the testimony of Patrolman McKenna). 
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herself."55 Innis then interrupted the officers and told them to "turn 
the car around so that he could show them where the gun was 10-
cated."56 When they arrived back at the scene of the arrest, the cap-
tain again advised Innis of his Miranda rights, but Innis replied "that 
he 'wanted to get the gun out of the way because of the kids in the 
area in the school.' "57 
The trial court found that Innis made the statements after being 
completely and repeatedly informed of his Fifth Amendment rights 
and accordingly admitted his statement into evidence. 58 The Rhode 
Island Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the 
case,59 holding that Innis had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to 
counsel, and that the patrolmen violated that right by conversing as 
they did in the car and that all interrogation should have ceased.60 
The United States Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine 
whether the patrolmen had in fact conducted an interrogation.61 
The Court decided that Miranda did not apply just to situations in-
volving express questioning, recognizing that the police might use "in-
direct" methods of interrogation, and held that Miranda applies to 
both express questioning and its "functional equivalent."62 The Court 
defined "functional equivalent" as "words or actions on the part of the 
police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) 
that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incrimi-
nating response."63 The Court explained that the intent of the police 
is not relevant, instead focusing on the perceptions of the suspect.64 
The Court described its inquiry as an objective test, with the subjective 
intent of the police acting as only a factor for a court to consider in 
determining whether certain words or actions were the functional 
equivalent of direct questions.65 
55. Id. (quoting the testimony of Patrolman Williams who testified that he over-
heard this comment made by Patrolman Gleckman). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 296. 
59. State v. Innis, 391 A.2d 1158, 1164 (R.I. 1978). 
60. Id. 
61. Innis, 446 U.S. at 293. 
62. Id. at 299 n.3, 300-01. Indirect questioning had gained popularity as a 
more effective means of interrogating suspects. See Welsh S. White, Interro-
gation Without Questions: Rhode Island v. Innis and United States v. Henry, 
78 MICH. L. REv. 1209, 1211 (1980) (footnotes omitted) ("Leading police 
manuals today reflect an awareness that the high-pressure browbeating 
practices of the past are less likely to be effective than subtler, more psycho-
logically oriented tactics, including some that involve no questioning of the 
suspect at all."). 
63. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. The Court explained that incriminating responses 
include both exculpatory and inculpatory statements "that the prosecution 
may seek to introduce at trial." Id. at 301 n.5. 
64. Id. at 301. 
65. Id. at 301-02 nn.7-8. 
64 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 34 
The Court concluded that the conversation between the officers in 
the police car did not amount to interrogation.66 First, because the 
conversation included no express questioning, it failed to satisfy the 
first prong of the definition.67 Second, the Court concluded that the 
officers' conversation was not the functional equivalent of interroga-
tion.68 The majority held that the officers should not "have known 
that their conversation was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response from [Innis]."69 Also, "There is nothing in the record to 
suggest that the officers were aware that the respondent was peculiarly 
susceptible to an appeal to his conscience concerning the safety of 
handicapped children.,,7o The Court characterized the conversation 
as consisting of nothing more than "a few ofThand remarks" and 
found that this was not a case where the officers "carried on a lengthy 
harangue."71 Indeed, the Court found that the conversation, under 
the circumstances, was not "particularly evocative."72 
The Innis opinion drew sharp dissents.73 Justice Marshall wrote that 
he agreed with the m.yority's definition of interrogation-that the Mi-
randa safeguards should "apply whenever the police conduct is in-
tended or likely to produce a response from a suspect in custody."74 
He summarized the majority'S position as requiring an "objective in-
quiry into the likely effect of police conduct on a typical individual," 
while also taking into account particular sensitivities of the suspect 
that the police know about. 75 
Despite this substantial agreement, Justice Marshall lambasted, "I 
am utterly at a loss, however, to understand how this objective stan-
dard as applied to the facts before us can rationally lead to the conclu-
sion that there was no interrogation."76 He continued: 
One can scarcely imagine a stronger appeal to the con-
science of a suspect-any suspect-than the assertion that if 
the weapon is not found an innocent person will be hurt or 
killed. And not just any innocent person, but an innocent 
child-a little girl-a helpless, handicapped little girl on her 
way to school. The notion that such an appeal could not be 
expected to have any effect unless the suspect were known to 
have some special interest in handicapped children verges 
66. Id. at 302. 
67. Id. at 302 ("Rather, that conversation was, at least in form, nothing more 
than a dialogue between two officers to which no response from the re-
spondent was invited."). 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 303. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 305-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
74. Id. at 305 (Marshall, j., dissenting). 
75. Id. (Marshall, j., dissenting). 
76. Id. (Marshall, j., dissenting). 
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on the ludicrous. As a matter of fact, the appeal to a suspect 
to confess for the sake of others, to "display some evidence of 
decency and honor," is a classic interrogation technique.77 
Justice Marshall concluded that the officers' remarks would have 
clearly been an interrogation if they had been directed to Innis and 
that the result should not change simply because the remarks were 
addressed to another police officer.78 The police were not overheard 
accidentally; instead, the police engaged in this conversation in-
tending Innis to hear and should have been held accountable for the 
pressures to speak that they were creating. 79 
Mter Innis was decided, many courts began examining statements 
that suspects made during routine booking procedures in light of the 
definition of interrogation.8o Several courts determined that the pol-
icy reasons behind Miranda did not apply to the collection of bio-
graphical material from suspects so that continued questioning-if 
the questions were routine and not investigatory-was permissible 
even after the suspect had invoked either the Fifth Amendment right 
to remain silent or right to counsel.81 Other courts examined the in-
tent of the police: Did they specifically plan and expect to receive an 
incriminating answer from the suspect?82 
2. Pennsylvania v. Muni7!3 
Although the Supreme Court specifically addressed routine book-
ing questions in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, no clear rule emerged from 
this fractured plurality opinion.84 The opinion of the Court answers 
only a limited question and creates no new rule or test. 
77. 
78. 
79. 
80. 
81. 
82. 
83. 
84. 
[d. at 306 (Marshall, j., dissenting) (citing F. INBAU & J. REm, CRIMINAL 
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 60-62 (Williams & Wilkins 2d ed. 1967) as 
providing an example to his proposition). 
[d. (Marshall, j., dissenting). 
[d. at 30tH)7 (Marshall, j., dissenting). 
See infra notes 82-83. 
See infra Section II.A. 
See, e.g., United States v. Glen-Archila, 677 F.2d 809, 815 (11th Cir. 1982) 
(discussing the booking procedure: "The interrogation appears to have 
been a straightforward attempt to secure biographical data necessary to 
complete booking, and the questions asked did not relate, even tangen-
tially, to criminal activity."); United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1238 
(9th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted) (explaining that an exception for rou-
tine booking procedures arises because background questions rarely elicit 
an incriminating response: "Ordinarily, the routine gathering of back-
ground biographical data will not constitute interrogation. Yet we recog-
nize the potential for abuse by law enforcement officers who might, under 
the guise of seeking 'objective' or 'neutral' information, deliberately elicit 
an incriminating statement from a suspect."). 
496 U.S. 582 (1990). 
[d. at 600-01. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy joined Justice Bren-
nan in the plurality opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices 
White, Blackmun, and Stevens, filed an opinion that addressed the booking 
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The opinion of the Court concludes that a question asking the de-
fendant for the date of his sixth birthday is testimonial and should 
have been suppressed since it was asked in the absence of Miranda 
warnings.85 Further, the defendant's statements made while the po-
lice were instructing him about a breathalyzer test were not responses 
to interrogation because the officer's instructions and questions were 
limited to whether Muniz understood the test and wished to submit to 
it, and were in accord with legitimate police procedure and "were not 
likely to be perceived as calling for any incriminating response."86 
Several of the justices, however, held that seven other questions po-
lice had asked the defendant-his name, address, height, weight, eye 
color, date of birth, and current age-"are nonetheless admissible be-
cause the questions fall within a 'routine booking question' excep-
tion."87 Justice Brennan, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and 
Kennedy, wrote: 
We disagree with the Commonwealth's contention that Of-
ficer Hosterman's first seven questions regarding Muniz's 
name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and 
current age do not qualify as custodial interrogation as we 
defined the term in Innis, merely because the questions were 
not intended to elicit information for investigatory 
purposes.88 
Justice Brennan also applied the definition of interrogation to state-
ments Muniz made in response to the officer's directions to perform 
sobriety tests.89 Justice Brennan rejected the defense's claim that 
statements Muniz gave during the sobriety tests violated Miranda: 
Officer Hosterman's dialogue with Muniz concerning the 
physical sobriety tests consisted primarily of carefully 
scripted instructions as to how the tests were to be per-
formed. These instructions were not likely to be perceived as 
calling for any verbal response and therefore were not 
"words or actions" constituting custodial interrogation, with 
two narrow exceptions not relevant here.90 
questions without analysis, finding that the videotaped answers were not 
testimonial and thus did not warrant application of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 608 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring 
in part, concurring in the result in part, and dissenting in part). 
85. Id. at 590-94, 600. 
86. Id. at 605 (citation omitted). 
87. Id. at 601 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). 
88. Id. at 601 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (citation omitted). 
89. Id. at 603-04. 
90. Id. at 603. Justice Brennan did not provide a citation for the quoted "words 
or actions" language, although it can be found in the Innis definition of the 
functional equivalent of interrogation. 446 U.S. at 301. The two excep-
tions consist of Officer Hosterman's requests that Muniz count aloud from 
1 to 9 while performing the "walk and turn" test and that he count aloud 
from 1 to 30 while balancing during the "one leg stand" test. Muniz's 
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Justice Brennan further explained that the dialogue "contained lim-
ited and carefully worded inquiries as to whether Muniz understood 
those instructions, but these focused inquiries were necessarily 'at-
tendant to'" a legitimate field sobriety test, so that "Muniz's incrimi-
nating utterances during this phase of the videotaped proceedings 
were 'voluntary' in the sense that they were not elicited in response to 
custodial interrogation."91 Justice Brennan cited South Dakota v. Nev-
ille,92 where the Court held that asking a suspect to submit to a blood 
alcohol test was not interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. 93 
Similarly, Justice Brennan concluded that statements made by Muniz 
during an explanation of how a breathalyzer examination worked 
"were not prompted" by custodial interrogation because the officer 
administering the test "carefully limited her role to providing Muniz 
with relevant information about the breathalyzer test and the Implied 
Consent Law."94 He reasoned that "[t]hese limited and focused in-
quiries were necessarily 'attendant to' the legitimate police proce-
dure . . . and were not likely to be perceived as calling for any 
incriminating response. "95 
Justice Marshall, in a separate opinion that concurred in part and 
dissented in part, concluded that the question regarding Muniz's 
birthday was custodial interrogation.96 He disagreed with the creation 
of a routine booking question exception to Miranda, instead asserting 
that a straightforward analysis of whether an interchange between a 
suspect and the police constituted interrogation was sufficient to 
cover the issue of routine booking questions.97 The first and simplest 
step in this analysis is to consider whether the interchange involved a 
direct question.98 To Justice Marshall, the primary question at issue-
the date of Muniz's sixth birthday-"clearly constituted custodial in-
terrogation because it was a form of 'express questioning."'99 Instead 
of instituting a new exception to Miranda for routine booking ques-
tions, he opined that "[ t] he far better course would be to maintain 
the clarity of the doctrine by requiring police to preface all direct 
questioning of a suspect with Miranda warnings if they want his re-
sponses to be admissible at trial."lOo 
counting at the officer's request qualifies as a response to custodial interro-
gation. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 603 n.17. 
91. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 603-04. 
92. 459 U.S. 553 (1983). 
93. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 604 (citing Neville, 459 U.S. at 564 n.15). 
94. Id. at 605. 
95. Id. (citation omitted). 
96. Id. at 608 (Marshall,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
97. See id. at 610-11 (Marshall,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
98. See id. at 610 (Marshall,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
99. Id. at 611 n.l (Marshall,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quot-
ing Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01). 
100. Id. at 610 (Marshall,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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He further concluded that the officers' instructions regarding the 
sobriety tests and breathalyzer examination were the "'functional 
equivalent' of express questioning because," given Muniz's apparent 
intoxication, "the police should have known that their conduct was 
'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.' "101 He ex-· 
plained that the Innis decision instructed that the "perceptions of the 
suspect" are of paramount concern in determining whether words or 
actions of police are the functional equivalent of direct question-
ing. l02 Given Muniz's apparent intoxication and the statements he 
had made during the roadside sobriety tests, Justice Marshall con-
cluded that the police who booked him should have known that their 
words and actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating re-
sponse. l03 Therefore, he concluded, "Muniz's statements were thus 
the product of custodial interrogation and should have been sup-
pressed because Muniz was not first given the Miranda warnings."104 
In sum, four justices-Brennan, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy-
explicitly recognized a routine booking question exception to Mi-
randa for "questions to secure the 'biographical data necessary to com-
plete booking or pretrial services.' "105 One explicitly rejected a 
separate exception to Miranda: Justice Marshall.106 Justices Rehn-
quist, Stevens, White, and Blackmun expressed no opinion on the 
question of a routine booking question exception. 
II. ROUTINE BOOKING QUESTIONS CONSTITUTE "INTERRO-
GATION" BECAUSE THEY ARE EXPRESS QUESTIONING OF 
A PERSON IN CUSTODY 
Lower courts have sharply split over the conceptual foundation of 
the routine booking question exception. 107 One approach is to ana-
lyze routine booking questions to determine whether they are interro-
gation at all;108 the second approach is to treat routine booking 
questions as an exception to the Miranda doctrine. 109 The majority of 
courts draw on the definition of the functional equivalent of express 
questioning found in Rhode Island v. Innis to conclude that routine 
booking questions do not constitute "interrogation."llo The plurality 
in Muniz, however, and a few lower courts, have held that asking rou-
101. Id. at 612-13 (Marshall,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quot-
ing Innis, 446 U.S. at 301). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 613 (Marshall,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
104. Id. at 614 (Marshall,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
105. Id. at 601 (citation omitted). 
106. Id. at 609-10 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
107. See infra Part IIA-C. 
108. See infra Part llA. 
109. See infra Part lIB. 
110. See infra Part llA. 
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tine booking questions does amount to interrogationYI Inclusion of 
routine booking questions in the definition of interrogation is most 
consistent with the Supreme Court's pronouncements on the mean-
ing of interrogation. 
A. Application of the Innis Definition of Interrogation 
In Miranda, the Supreme Court defined interrogation as "question-
ing initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken 
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way."112 Fourteen years later, the Supreme Court ex-
plained in Innis that, "the term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers 
not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on 
the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest 
and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit 
an incriminating response from the suspect."113 
As a matter of plain language, the Innis Court's definition of inter-
rogation includes two situations: (1) express questioning, and (2) 
other "words or actions on the part of the police (other than those 
normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know 
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response."1l4 
At least prior to Muniz, only the Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit followed the rule that all express questioning during the booking 
process constitutes per se interrogationY5 It held that "[t]he excep-
tion in Innis for police actions or statements 'normally attendant to 
arrest and custody' does not apply to the 'express questioning' which 
occurred here, but only to its 'functional equivalent. "'116 
Other courts immediately questioned, however, whether the Innis 
Court meant what it said about express questioningY 7 In a case de-
cided shortly after Innis, the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia considered the possibility that booking questions, "though 
express questions, may not be considered part of 'express question-
ing."'118 Subsequently, many courts have explicitly rejected the plain 
language reading of Innis and have concluded that asking booking 
111. 
112. 
113. 
114. 
115. 
116. 
117. 
118. 
See infra notes 131-36 and accompanying text. 
384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (defining custodial interrogation). 
446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980); see also White, supra note 62, at 1223 (footnote 
omitted) ("[IJt is now clear that 'interrogauon' can take place even when 
the police speech is not punctuated by a question mark, nor directly ad-
dressed to the suspect. Moreover, it is also clear that 'interrogation' now 
includes police tactics which do not even involve speech."). 
Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-02. 
See United States v. Montgomery, 714 F.2d 201,202 (1st Cir. 1983) ("Since 
the questioning here was eXRress, we have no occasion to go farther. This 
was custodial interrogation.'). 
United States v. Downing, 665 F.2d 404, 407 (1st Cir. 1981). 
See infra note 120 and accompanying text. 
United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 522 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
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questions, although direct questions calling for a response from a sus-
pect, are neither express questions nor interrogation. 119 
Many courts have conflated the two portions of the Innis definition 
when considering routine booking questions. 120 In United States v. Bo-
gle,121 the D.C. Circuit, which had previously held that all express 
questioning was interrogation,122 explicitly adopted a mixture of the 
Innis language when considering routine booking questions: "[O]nly 
questions that are reasonably likely to elicit incriminating information 
in the specific circumstances of the case constitute interrogation 
within the protections of Miranda."123 
119. See, e.g., United States v. Bogle, 114 F.3d 1271, 1274-75 (D.C. Cir. 1997); 
State v. Evans, 523 A.2d 1306, 1314 (Conn. 1987) ("Although the United 
States Supreme Court's opinion appears to assume that direct questioning 
of a suspect in custody always constitutes interrogation, courts which have 
addressed the issue after Innis have held that the reasoning which supports 
Innis and the purpose behind Miranda itself, compel the conclusion that 
not every express question posed in a custodial setting is equivalent to 'in-
terrogation."'); Jones v. United States, 779 A.2d 277, 282-83 (D.C. 2001) 
("Such a construction of the critical sentence in Innis may be plausible as a 
matter of syntax, but it has been rejected by numerous authorities, and we 
do not find it persuasive."); State v. Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d 305, 309 
(Minn. 1999) ("Although Innis dealt with statements rather than questions, 
the Court made it clear that even express questions are not always interro-
gation. For example, routine booking questions are exempt from Miranda 
requirements."); State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 84 (Tenn. 2001) ("Never-
theless, because its proscription on express questioning without the Mi-
randa safeguards is unqualified, the Innis definition of interrogation 
appears, upon first reading, to exclude from evidence all answers to express 
questioning while the defendant is in custody. No case has ever extended 
the holding of Innis this far .... "). 
120. See, e.g., Bogle, 114 F.3d at 1275 ("[W]e hold that express questioning consti-
tutes interrogation only when it is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminat-
ing response .... "); United States v. Gotchis, 803 F.2d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 1986) 
("Routme questions about a suspect's identity and marital status ... are 
rather the sort of questions 'normally attendant to arrest and custody.''' 
(quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301)); United States v. Stewart, 770 F. Supp. 872, 
879 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("Questions 'normally attendant to arrest and custody' 
are explicitly excluded from the Supreme Court's definition of'interroga-
tion.'" (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301)); State v. Sallis, 574 N.W.2d 15,18 
(Iowa 1998) ("It is the rule that questions 'normally attendant to arrest and 
custody' do not constitute interrogation." (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301)); 
Commonwealth v. Kacavich, 550 N.E.2d 397, 397 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) 
("Interrogation under Miranda does not involve questioning 'normally at-
tendant to arrest and custody.'" (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301)); Wilson v. 
State, 857 S.W.2d 90,94 (Tex .. Ct. App. 1993) ("Questioning 'normally at-
tendant to arrest and custody' is not interrogation." (quoting Innis, 446 
U.S. at 301)); Wright v. Commonwealth, 348 S.E.2d 9, 12 (Va. Ct. App. 
1986) ("The term 'interrogation' under Miranda does not include words or 
actions by the police which are normally attendant to arrest and custody." 
(citing Innis, 446 U.S. at 301)). 
121. 114 F.3d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
122. See, e.g., Proctor v. United States, 404 F.2d 819, 820-21 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
123. Bogle, 114 F.3d at 1275. 
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed a similar line 
of reasoning. In its influential decision in United States v. Booth, the 
Ninth Circuit quoted Innis for the proposition that "interrogation may 
be 'either express questioning or its functional equivalent,''' and "ad-
mit[ted] that the Court's opinion appears to assume that direct ques-
tioning of a suspect in custody always constitutes interrogation."124 
The Ninth Circuit also noted, however, that the Innis Court found 
that interrogation "must reflect a measure of compulsion above and 
beyond that inherent in custody itself."125 Applying this principle to 
express questioning as well as its functional equivalent, the court rea-
soned that" [a] definition of interrogation that included any question 
posed by a police officer would be broader than that required to im-
plement the policy of Miranda itself."126 The Ninth Circuit held that 
express questions constitute interrogation only when they "are 'rea-
sonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the sus-
pect,' "127 and has continued to adhere to this reasoning. 128 
B. Application of the Muniz Treatment of Routine Booking Questions As 
Interrogation 
By the time the Supreme Court addressed routine booking ques-
tions in Muniz, the Innis approach to routine booking questions had 
gained widespread acceptance.129 The Muniz plurality, however, took 
a different approach by deciding that routine booking questions 
amounted to interrogation. 130 Justice Brennan rejected Penn-
sylvania'S claim that biographical questions "do not qualify as custo-
dial interrogation as [the Court] defined the term in Innis . .. merely 
because the questions were not intended to elicit information for in-
vestigatory purposes."131 Justice Marshall likewise concluded that the 
124. 
125. 
126. 
127. 
128. 
129. 
130. 
131. 
United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Innis, 
446 U.S. at 300-01). 
Id. (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 300). Other courts have used similar reason-
ing to conclude that routine booking questions are not interrogation. See 
Bogle, 114 F.3d at 1275; United States v. Carmona, 873 F.2d 569, 573 (2d 
Cir. 1989); United States v. Avery, 717 F.2d 1020, 1024 (6th Cir. 1983); 
People v. Anderson, 837 P.2d 293, 296 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Sallis, 574 
N.W.2d at 18; State v. Williams, 623 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
1981) . 
Booth, 669 F.2d at 1237. 
Id. (citing Innis, 446 U.S. at 301). 
See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 227 F.3d 1096, 1102-03 (9th Cir.. 2000) 
(quoting Booth, 669 F.2d at 1237). 
See supra section II.A. 
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990); but see Thomas v. United 
States, 731 A.2d 415, 423 n.12 (D.C. 1999) (indicating that the approach 
taken by the majority of courts-that if the police should know a question is 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from a suspect, then it 
amounts to interrogation-is different from the approach explained by the 
Court in Muniz). 
Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601 (Brennan,]., plurality opinion) (citation omitted). 
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booking questions were interrogation because they were express ques-
tions. 132 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the remaining justices, 
did not address the question. 133 
Despite the clearly expressed rationale of the five justices, some 
lower courts nonetheless cite Muniz for the proposition that routine 
booking questions are not interrogation.134 A minority of courts, how-
ever, have recognized that routine booking questions constitute custo-
dial interrogation within the meaning of Innis. 135 
Many courts, both federal and state, have held that routine booking 
questions are not interrogation.136 For example, the Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit, in deciding that collecting routine biographical 
data is exempt from Miranda, held that" [a] request for routine infor-
mation necessary for basic identification purposes is not interrogation 
under Miranda, even if the information turns out to be incriminat-
ing."137 Similarly, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that "the pur-
pose of the Miranda rule is to protect a suspect against investigative 
interrogation and not from the routine gathering of basic identifying 
data needed for booking and arraignment. Thus, interrogation does 
not include questions 'normally attendant to arrest and custody.' "138 
132. 
133. 
134. 
135. 
136. 
137. 
138. 
Id. at 611 n.1 (Marshall, j., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
See id. at 606-08 (Rehnquist, CJ. concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 857 S.w.2d 90, 94 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (finding 
that" L q] uestions incident to booking are outside the constitutional defini-
tion of 'interrogation'" (citing Muniz, 496 U.S. at 600». 
See State v.Jones, 656 A.2d 696,701 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) (finding "[t]he 
questions the police asked of the defendant during the booking procedure 
qualify as custodial interrogation"); People v. Rodney, 648 N.E.2d 471, 473 
(N.Y. 1995) (asserting "[t]he Supreme Court has recognized that 'routine 
booking questions' constitute custodial interrogation"); In re Travis S., 685 
N'y.S.2d 886, 890 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1999) (quoting Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601..{)2) 
(asserting "[t]he Supreme Court has held that the asking of 'routine book-
ing questions' constitutes custodial interrogation, but that answers given in 
response to those questions fall outside the protection of Miranda if they 
are 'reasonably related to the police's administrative concerns"'); State v. 
Geasley, 619 N.E.2d 1086, 1089 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (stating that "[w]hile 
finding that such questioning constitutes interrogation, the court held it 
permissible when 'reasonably related to the police's administrative con-
cerns'" (quoting Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601-02». 
See United States v. Bogle, 114 F.3d 1271, 1274-75 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (re-
jecting a definition of interrogation that would include all express question-
ing, including routine booking questions); United States v. Stewart, 770 F. 
Supp. 872, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding " [a]gent Finn's questions concern-
ing pedigree are questions normally attendant to custody, and therefore do 
not constitute interrogation"); United States v. Brown, 744 F. Supp. 558, 
569 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that routine booking questions do not 
amount to custodial interrogation). 
United States v. Brown, 101 F.3d 1272, 1274 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting 
United States v. McLaughlin, 777 F.2d 388, 391 (8th Cir. 1985), an earlier 
opinion of the court which predated Muniz). The court in Brown also re-
ferred to Muniz in support of this proposition. Id. 
People v. Anderson, 837 P.2d 293, 296 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting In-
nis, 446 U.S. at 301). 
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Many other courts have similarly ignored or misquoted Muniz when 
addressing whether booking questions are interrogation. 139 A num-
ber of courts have cited Justice Brennan's plurality opinion for the 
proposition that routine booking questions form a blanket exception 
to Miranda. 140 
Hawaii has gone so far as to explicitly consider the distinction be-
tween analyzing routine booking questions under the definition of in-
terrogation and treating them as falling under an exception, and 
rejecting the exception approach taken in Muniz. In 1993, the Inter-
139. See, e.g., Thomas v. United States, 731 A.2d 415, 424 (D.C. 1999) (stating 
"[t]he underlying rationale for the exception is that routine booking ques-
tions do not constitute interrogation because they do not normally elicit 
incriminating responses"); Allred v. State, 622 So. 2d 984, 987, 987 n.lO 
(Fla. 1993) (finding that "routine booking questions do not require Mi-
randa warnings" and that Muniz held that they are not interrogation); 
Slaughter v. State, 525 S.E.2d 130, 133 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (referring to 
questions seeking biographical information as "not interrogation under Mi-
randa"); Curry v. State, 643 N.E.2d 963, 977 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (stating 
that" [I] imited and focused inquiries on the part of police normally attend-
ant to arrest and custody do not constitute custodial interrogation"); State 
v. Sallis, 574 N.W.2d 15, 18 (Iowa 1998) (finding that "[i]t is the rule that 
questions 'normally attendant to arrest and custody' do not constitute inter-
rogation" (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301)); State v. Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d 
305, 309 (Minn. 1999) (asserting that "[a]lthough Innis dealt with state-
ments rather than questions, the Court made it clear that even express 
questions are not always interrogation. For example, routine booking ques-
tions are exempt from Miranda requirements."); Alexander v. State, 736 So. 
2d 1058, 1063 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (finding "the information about 
whether Alexander lived in the trailer was no more than biographical infor-
mation that the booking officer would have received during routine book-
ing procedures, and therefore, these questions are 'non-interrogative' 
within the meaning of Miranda"); State v. Causey, 761 N.E.2d 644, 647 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (finding that "[r]outine booking questions do not 
constitute custodial interrogation"); Commonwealth v.Jasper, 587 A.2d 
705, 708-09 (Pa. 1991) (asserting "general information such as name, 
height, weight, residence, occupation, etc. is not the kind of information 
which requires Miranda warnings since it is not information generally con-
sidered as part of an interrogation"); Wilson v. State, 857 S.W.2d 90, 94 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that "[q]uestions incident to booking are 
outside the constitutional definition of 'interrogation."'); State v. Walton, 
824 P.2d 533, 535 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (asserting that "request[s] for 
routine information necessary for basic identification purposes [are] not 
interrogation even if the information revealed is incriminating"). 
140. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 227 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000) (find-
ing that "[s]uch limited, biographical questions are permitted even after a 
person invokes his or her Miranda rights"); Brown, 101 F.3d at 1274 (hold-
ing that "routine biographical data is exempted from Miranda's coverage"); 
Baird v. State, 440 S.E.2d 190, 192 (Ga. 1994) (holding that questions re-
garding age, marital status, address, and education "fall[ ] within the 'rou-
tine booking questions' exemption from Miranda"); People v. Abdelmassih, 
577 N.E.2d 861, 864-65 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that non-incriminatory 
questions, such as defendant's place of employment, were "not proscribed 
by Miranda"); Rodney, 648 N.E.2d at 473 (holding that answers given to rou-
tine booking questions "are not suppressible even when obtained in viola-
tion of Miranda . .. "). 
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mediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii adopted the routine booking 
question analysis of Muniz, but determined that under the circum-
stances, "[t]he routine booking question exception [did] not ap-
ply ... [because] the police should have known that [the question] 
was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response."141 In 2001, 
the Supreme Court of Hawaii criticized the intermediate court's analy-
sis, writing that the lower court's 
formulation of the routine booking question exception im-
pliedly acknowledges that the "exception" is, when scruti-
nized, no real exception at all. Rather, whether a question is 
a "routine booking question," the answer to which, generally 
speaking, is not reasonably likely to be incriminating, is sim-
ply an aspect of the totality of the circumstances considered 
in determining whether the questioning officer has sub-
jected the accused to "interrogation."142 
The Supreme Court of Hawaii thus declined, as a matter of state con-
stitutionallaw, to adopt a routine booking question exception, reason-
ing that such analysis was subsumed in the determination of 
interrogation. 143 
Only a few courts have recognized the holding in Muniz that rou-
tine booking questions are a form of interrogation. For example, New 
York's highest court has acknowledged that, "[t]he Supreme Court 
has recognized that 'routine booking questions' constitute custodial 
interrogation. "144 These few courts cite Muniz for the proposition 
that routine booking questions are a form of interrogation, and dis-
cuss the questions under an exception to Miranda rather than exclud-
ing them from Miranda analysis altogether.145 
A recent Supreme Court case is likely to heighten, rather than elim-
inate, the confusion in the lower courts. In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dis-
trict Court of Nevada, Humboldt County,146 the Supreme Court upheld a 
Nevada statute that required a person to identify himself during an 
investigatory, non-custodial stop against Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
challenges. 147 The state contended that a person's name was outside 
the scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause because it was nontestimo-
141. 
142. 
143. 
144. 
145. 
146. 
147. 
State v. Blackshire, 861 P.2d 736, 742 (Haw. Ct. App. 1993). 
State v. Ketchum, 34 P.3d 1006, 1018 (Haw. 2001). 
Id. 
People v. Rodney, 648 N.E.2d 471, 473 (N.Y. 1995); see also In re Travis S., 
685 N.Y.S.2d 886, 890 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1999) (finding that "[t]he Supreme 
Court has held that the asking of 'routine booking questions' constitutes 
custodial interrogation ... " (citing Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 
601-02)) . 
See State v. Jones, 656 A.2d 696, 701 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995); Hughes v. State, 
346 Md. 80, 91, 97, 695 A.2d 132, 138, 138 n.2, 141 (1997); Rndney, 648 
N.E.2d at 473; In re Travis S., 685 N.Y.S.2d at 890-91; State v. Geasley, 619 
N.E.2d 1086, 1089 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). 
124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004). 
Id. at 2459-61. 
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nial. 148 The Court "dec1ine[d] to resolve the case on that basis,"149 
reasoning that, "[s]tating one's name may qualify as an assertion of 
fact relating to identity."150 The Court ultimately held that the Self-
Incrimination Clause did not protect the defendant's refusal to pro-
vide his name because the name was not incriminating, but noted that 
"a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing 
identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the 
chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate of-
fense."151 Hiibel provides little guidance to courts addressing routine 
booking questions. 
C. Routine Booking Questions Are a Form oj Interrogation 
Despite the majority of lower courts that have ruled or assumed oth-
erwise,152 questions such as "Where do you live?" are a form of interro-
gation as a matter of both Supreme Court precedent153 and common 
sense. The conclusion of many courts that routine booking questions 
are not interrogation is simply not consistent with the Supreme 
Court's Miranda jurisprudence. 154 From Miranda on, every Supreme 
Court case to consider the topic has held that express questioning 
constitutes interrogation. 155 . 
Thus, Innis broadened, not narrowed, the definition of interroga-
tion. Miranda itself, of course, defined interrogation as "questioning 
initiated by law enforcement officers."156 Innis considered not 
whether classes of questions exist that should be excluded from the 
definition of interrogation, but whether interrogation was limited to 
express questioning. 157 The Court in Innis noted that the definition 
of interrogation in Miranda "and other references throughout the 
opinion to 'questioning' might suggest that the Miranda rules were to 
apply only to those police interrogation practices that involve express 
questioning of a defendant while in custody. We do not, however, 
construe the Miranda opinion so narrowly."158 When the Court in In-
nis defined interrogation as "either express questioning or its func-
148. Id. at 2460. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 2460-61. 
151. Id. at 2461. 
152. See supra Section LB. 
153. See supra Section II. 
154. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
155. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582,597 n.ll, 600, 601 (1990); 
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298 (1980). 
156. 384 U.S. at 444. 
157. See 446 U.S. at 298-99, 300-0l. 
158. Id. at 298-99; see also id. at 299 n.3 ("To limit the ambit of Miranda to ex-
press questioning would 'place a premium on the ingenuity of the police to 
devise methods of indirect interrogation, rather than to implement the 
plain mandate of Miranda.'" (quoting Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 285 
A.2d 172, 175 (Pa. 1971))). 
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tional equivalent,"159 the Court treated the functional equivalent of 
express questioning as an expansion of interrogation. This "latter 
portion of [the] definition" focuses on the perceptions of the suspect 
rather than the police.160 
A test to determine the functional equivalent of interrogation is 
necessary because the issue is open to dispute. 161 A direct question, 
on the other hand, is easy to identify, and the majority and dissenters 
do not dispute what constitutes express questioning or how to deter-
mine it. The members of the Court perceived nuances in the determi-
nation of the functional equivalent of express questioning, but found 
none in the determination of express questioning. The Supreme 
Court in Innis found the meaning of express questioning unambigu-
ous, and reserved the debate over the relative importance of police 
intent and suspect's perceptions for the functional equivalent of 
questioning.162 
Despite the attempts of some lower courts to conflate the issues in-
volved in express questioning and its functional equivalent,163 a plain 
159. Id. at 300-0l. 
160. Id. at 301. This additional test is as important in the analysis of express 
questioning as it is in the analysis of its functional equivalent. The interac-
tion between the intent of the police and the perceptions of the suspect 
formed one of the fundamental disagreements between the majority and 
dissent in Innis. The majority wrote that an action or conduct "that the 
police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response 
from a suspect ... amounts to interrogation." Id. Justice Stevens main-
tained in the dissent that "the definition of 'interrogation' must include 
any police statement or conduct that has the same purpose or effect as a 
direct question." Id. at 311 (Stevens, j., dissenting). The Court re-ex-
amined the definition of interrogation, focusing on the subjective percep-
tions of the defendant in Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987). In that 
case, the defendant had invoked his right to counsel, but the police allowed 
his wife to talk to him with a police officer listening, and with a tape re-
corder in the room. Id. at 520. The Court held that the police had not 
interrogated the defendant, despite the fact that they knew that the defen-
dant might make an incriminating statement to his wife and despite the 
fact that they had placed the tape recorder in the room with the express 
purpose of creating a record of his statements. Id. at 527, 528-29. The 
Court also held that " [o]fficers do not interrogate a suspect simply by hop-
ing that he will incriminate himself." Id. at 529. The decision turned on 
the subjective intent of the police and the reasonable perceptions of the 
defendant: "We doubt that a suspect, told by officers that his wife will be 
allowed to speak to him, would feel that he was being coerced to incrimi-
nate himself in any way." Id. at 528. 
161. Compare Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 (defining interrogation as including "any 
words or actions on the part of the police ... that the police should know 
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response"), with id. at 309 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "any statement that would normally be 
understood by the average listener as calling for a response is the func-
tional equivalent of a direct question ... " and that the majority "takes a 
much narrower view"). 
162. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 298-99, 301. 
163. See supra note 120. 
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reading of Innis clearly establishes that questions are interrogation. 
Interrogation includes express questioning, and some police words or 
actions beyond express questioning, but Innis does not contemplate 
express questions outside the definition of interrogation. This clear 
inclusion of questioning within interrogation, of course, does not 
mean that the element of custody is not necessary to bring an interro-
gation within the strictures of Miranda, or that exceptions to Miranda 
requirements do not exist. It does mean, however, that any express 
question, routine or not, booking-related or not, falls within the defi-
nition of interrogation. 
Indeed, the first part of the Court's application of its own definition 
to the facts showed that direct questions are interrogations when the 
Court concluded that the police officers' conversation failed the first 
prong of the interrogation test because it did not include questions 
directly posed to the suspect. 164 
Muniz confirmed that direct questions constitute interrogation. 165 
The opinion of the Court noted that, "for purposes of custodial inter-
rogation such a question [calling for a testimonial response] may be 
either express, as in this case, or else implied through words or actions 
reasonably likely to elicit a response."166 Justice Brennan, writing for 
four justices, distilled Innis to the proposition that 
custodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda includes 
both express questioning and words or actions that, given 
the officer's knowledge of any special susceptibilities of the 
suspect, the officer knows or reasonably should know are 
likely to "have ... the force of a question on the accused," 
and therefore be reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response. 167 
Justice Brennan explicitly wrote: 
We disagree with the Commonwealth's contention that Of-
ficer Hosterman's first seven questions regarding Muniz's 
name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and 
current age do not qualifY as custodial interrogation as we 
defined the term in Innis merely because the questions were 
not intended to elicit information for investigatory 
purposes.168 
Four other members of the Court, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
would have held that the "sixth birthday" question was not testimo-
164. Innis, 446 U.S. at 302. 
165. 496 U.S. 582, 600 (1990). 
166. Id. at 597 n.ll. 
167. Id. at 601 (Brennan,]., plurality opinion) (quoting Harryman v. Estelle, 616 
F.2d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 1980». 
168. Id. (Brennan,]., plurality opinion) (citation omitted). 
78 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 34 
nial, and did not address the question of interrogation at all. 169 Jus-
tice Marshall left no doubt that he considered the questions at issue in 
Muniz to be custodial interrogation.170 He wrote, "The sixth birthday 
question ... clearly constituted custodial interrogation because it was 
a form of 'express questioning.">}71 
Every Supreme Court case to consider the question has held that 
express questions are a form of interrogation, regardless of the pur-
pose behind or effect of asking those questions. 172 Under the reason-
ing of Muniz and its predecessors, therefore, routine booking 
questions constitute interrogation. 
III. . VARYING APPROACHES TO THE ROUTINE BOOKING 
QUESTION EXCEPTION 
Once courts conclude that routine booking questions are a form of 
interrogation, they must determine what test to apply in assessing 
whether a given question falls under the routine booking question 
exception. Courts and commentators have split on the appropriate 
test, often without recognizing a distinction between the competing 
approaches. 173 Some courts view the intent of the police as determi-
native, an approach largely derived from the language of the Muniz 
plurality.174 Other courts have applied the language of the Innis ma-
jority to assess the likelihood that a given question will produce an 
incriminating response. 175 Some have advocated a third approach, in 
which a court should inquire whether a reasonable person in the sus-
pect's place would view the questions as seeking incriminating infor-
mation. 176 To settle this debate, the Supreme Court will need to 
recognize and decide among the various approaches. 
Few courts have addressed, or even noticed, the tensions between 
the competing approaches to the routine booking question excep-
tion. In Hughes v. State, however, the highest court of Maryland con-
cluded that a meanin~ul distinction exists between Innis-based and 
Muniz-based analyses.1 7 It wrote: . 
169. 
170. 
17l. 
172. 
173. 
174. 
175. 
176. 
177. 
The difference between the two standards is that the [Muniz-
based test] limits the scope of the booking question excep-
See id. at 606-08 (Rehnquist, Cj., concurring in part, concurring in the re-
sult in part, and dissenting in part). 
Id. at 608,611 n.1 (Marshall,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Id. at 611 n.1 (Marshall,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quot-
ing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980». 
See, e.g., Muniz, 496 U.S. at 597 n.ll, 600, 601; Innis, 446 U.S. at 298. 
See infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text. 
See infra section III.A. 
See infra section III.B. 
See infra section III.e. 
346 Md. 80, 92-94, 695 A.2d 132, 138-39 (1997); see also Timbers v. Com-
monwealth, 503 S.E.2d 233,237 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing the three 
approaches described in this article). 
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tion based solely on the actual intent of the police officer in 
posing the question, while the [Innis-based test] restricts the 
exception based on an objective assessment of the likeli-
hood, in light of both the context of the questioning and the 
content of the question, that the question will elicit an in-
criminating response. 178 
79 
As the court in Hughes explained, "The distinction between the two 
standards has gone largely unremarked upon in post-Muniz discus-
sions of the routine booking exception."179 Indeed, Hughes appears to 
be the first to identifY the conflict. 180 
This section will discuss the main approaches courts have taken to 
the routine booking question exception, based either on the majority 
opinion in Innis or the plurality opinion in Muniz. It will also discuss a 
third way to approach booking questions, followed by a smaller num-
ber of courts, that combines the two approaches into a hybrid analysis 
of the questions. 
This is not to say that courts within one jurisdiction consistently ap-
ply one approach across their decisions. In adopting the hybrid ap-
proach to routine booking questions, the intermediate court of 
Virginia has noted that its prior decisions had variously addressed" (l) 
the subjective intent of the police, (2) the objective likelihood of self-
incrimination, and (3) an objective evaluation of the manifestation of 
the officer's intent."181 Most courts, however, have not even recog-
nized the multiple approaches, much less explicitly chosen among 
them. Although it is possible to articulate differences even within 
these three approaches,182 this trichotomy encompasses most of the 
differences between them. 
A. The Muniz-Based Approach: The Subjective Intent of Law Enforcement 
Officers 
The plurality in Muniz limited the scope of the routine booking 
question exception in the following language: "Without obtaining a 
waiver of the suspect's Miranda rights, the police may not ask ques-
tions, even during booking, that are designed to elicit incriminatory 
admissions."183 Consistent with the guidance given by the plurality, 
several federal courts have chosen to follow a subjective intent ap-
178. Hughes, 346 Md. at 93, 695 A.2d at 138. 
179. Id. 
180. See Abigail N. Ross, Recent Decision, Recognizing and Limiting the Rnutine 
Booking Question Exception, 57 MD. L. REv. 753, 769-70 (1998). 
181. Timbers, 503 S.E.2d at 237 (citations omitted). 
182. See, e.g., Alexander S. Helderman, Revisiting Rhode Island v. Innis: Offmng a 
New Interpretation of the Interrogation Test, 33 CREIGHTON L. REv. 729, 738-45 
(2000) (describing four approaches federal courts have taken in applying 
Innis). 
183. 496 U.S. at 602 n.14 (emphasis added). 
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proach to the routine booking question exception to Miranda. 184 In 
these cases, the intent of the investigating officer is not just relevant, 
but is determinative. 185 
The subjective intent approach to the routine booking question ex-
ception, interestingly, has its origin in Innis, which ultimately ruled 
that "the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the po-
lice" determine whether a statement is the functional equivalent of 
interrogation. 186 In dissent, Justice Stevens argued for a broader 
scope for interrogation than the "should have known" standard 
adopted by the majority: 
In short, in order to give full protection to a suspect's right 
to be free from any interrogation at all, the definition of "in-
terrogation" must include any police statement or conduct 
that has the same purpose or effect as a direct question. 
Statements that appear to call for a response from the sus-
pect, as well as those that are desig;ned to do so, should be con-
sidered interrogation. 187 
From reading Innis alone, it would be reasonable to conclude that 
the "designed to elicit" standard was all but irrelevant. In fact, the 
majority rejected the Rhode Island Supreme Court's suggestion that 
the meaning of interrogation under Miranda was similar in scope to 
the Sixth Amendment prohibition against" 'deliberately elicit[ing]' 
incriminating information from a defendant in the absence of coun-
sel after a formal charge .... "188 The majority wrote "that the Mi-
randa safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an 
184. See infra notes 193-205 and accompanying text. 
185. See id. 
186. 446 U.S. at 300-02. The Supreme Court reiterated this focus on the percep-
tions of the suspect in Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520,528-29 (1987), where 
the key factor in reaching the decision was "examining the situation from 
[the suspect's] perspective." 
187. Innis, 446 U.S. at 311 (Stevens, j., dissenting) (emphasis added). In fact, 
Justice Stevens argued for the third, "objective observer" approach detailed 
in Part III.C, infra. Id. The majority responded by explaining that its 
"should have known" standard includes police practices designed to elicit 
incriminating responses. Id. at 301-02. The majority noted: 
This is not to say that the intent of the police is irrelevant, for 
it may well have a bearing on whether the police should have 
known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to evoke 
an incriminating response. In particular, where a police practice is 
designed to elicit an incriminating response from the accused, it is un-
likely that the practice will not also be one which the police should 
have known was reasonably likely to have that effect. 
Id. at 301 n.7 (emphasis added). Justice Stevens quoted this language in 
return, and argued: "This factual assumption is extremely dubious. I would 
assume that police often interrogate suspects without any reason to believe 
that their efforts are likely to be successful in the hope that a statement will 
nevertheless be forthcoming." Id. at 311 n.8 (Stevens, j., dissenting). 
188. Id. at 300 n.4 (quoting Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964)). 
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added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without 
regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police."189 
Innis clearly held that what the police should know, not their intent or 
designs, is the key to determining the functional equivalent of 
interrogation.190 
Nevertheless, the Department of Justice resurrected the "designed" 
standard in its brief in Muniz, and Justice Brennan adopted it in his 
plurality opinion. 191 Mter holding that the biographical questions fall 
within the routine booking question exception, Justice Brennan 
warned in a footnote, 
As amicus United States explains, "[r ]ecognizing a 'booking 
exception' to Miranda does not mean, of course, that any 
question asked during the booking process falls within that 
exception. Without obtaining a waiver of the suspect's Mi-
randa rights, the police may not ask questions, even durin~ 
booking, that are designed to elicit incriminatory admissions."19 
Based on Justice Brennan's language, many courts have adopted a 
subjective intent test, focusing on the intent of the police in question-
ing suspects during booking. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit, for example, has determined the admissibility of answers to 
routine booking questions by examining the intent of the police in 
asking the questions. 193 In a case analyzing a conversation that oc-
curred immediately following the defendant's arrest, the Fourth Cir-
cuit decided that statements made by a Drug Enforcement Agency 
agent did not rise to the level of the functional equivalent of interro-
gation because the questions were not "an attempt to solicit 
information. "194 
In a later case, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the routine 
booking question exception does not apply to questions "that are de-
signed to elicit incriminatory admissions," but declined to consider 
whether the exception might also apply under other circumstances as 
well. 195 The court relied on, as determinative, the fact that "although 
[the defendant] gave as his address one of the stash houses, there is 
189. [d. at 301. 
190. [d. at 301-03. 
191. 496 U.S. 582, 601-02 (1990) (Brennan,]., plurality opinion) (quoting Brief 
for Amicus Curiae United States at 12-13, Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 
582 (1990) (No. 89-213». 
192. [d. at 602 n.14 (Brennan,]., plurality opinion) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Brief for Amicus Curiae United States at 13, Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 
U.S. 582 (1990) (No. 89-213». 
193. United States v. Jackson, 863 F.2d 1168, 1172 (4th Cir. 1989). 
194. [d. at 1171-72. 
195. United States v. D'Anjou, 16 F.3d 604, 608-09 (4th Cir. 1994); see also 
United States v. Taylor, 799 F.2d 126, 128 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that 
essentially any request for identifying information is ministerial and may be 
asked in the absence of Miranda warnings). This case, however, acknowl-
edges an objective inquiry in that it also mentions that the officers had no 
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no evidence in the record disclosing that it was believed at the time to 
be a stash house or that the police anticipated that the question re-
garding [the defendant's] address would be incriminating."196 In a 
third case, the Fourth Circuit described an exchange between depu-
ties and the defendant during "routine criminal processing" as an "ex-
change of insults" between the officers and the defendant rather than 
"a ploy to obtain incriminating information."197 
The Fourth Circuit thus does not examine whether the question 
was likely to uncover incriminating information, the possible reactions 
of a neutral observer to the questions, or the perceptions of the defen-
dant. Instead, the court treats the intent of the questioning officer as 
determinative.198 
Similarly, several other federal courts also focus on the intent of the 
police. 199 For example, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
has explained that the reason that routine booking questions are not 
interrogation is that they "do not normally elicit incriminating re-
sponses."200 But when the interrogator's intent belies the soundness 
of this justification, the court does not permit the admission of the 
answers.201 Specifically," [W] here questions regarding normally rou-
tine biographical information are designed to elicit incriminating in-
"reasonable expectation that their questions would be likely to elicit [in-
criminating] information." Id. 
196 .. D'Anjou, 16 F.3d at 609. 
197. Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1165 (4th Cir. 1997). The court does con-
sider, however, that the defendant does not "identify any words or conduct 
of the officers which were 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating re-
sponse.'" Id. (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301). 
198. See supra notes 193-97. 
199. See, e.g., United States v. Virgen-Moreno, 265 F.3d 276, 293-94 (5th Cir. 
2001) ("[Q]uestions designed to elicit incriminatory admissions are not 
covered under the routine booking question exception."); United States v. 
Carmona, 873 F.2d 569, 573 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Nor were the questions in-
tended, as in Edwards [v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)], to elicit a confes-
sion or incriminating information. The police meant only to gather 
ordinary information for administrative purposes."); United States v. Feld-
man, 788 F.2d 544, 554 (9th Cir. 1986) (considering the determinative fac-
tor that "Manavian's question to Feldman seeking his name was not aimed 
at eliciting a criminal response, but merely at corroborating the informa-
tion made available to the police by the rental agency"); United States v. 
Stewart, 770 F. Supp. 872, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("[A]lthough some pedigree 
information had been taken prior to the interview at FBI headquarters, 
there is no indication that Agent Finn's conduct was designed 'to elicit an 
incriminating response.'" (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301». 
200. United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir. 1993); see also United 
States v. Dougall, 919 F.2d 932, 935 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Previously, we have 
held the sort of biographical questions-name, birth information, address, 
height, weight-asked here are part of the booking routine, not intended 
to elicit damaging statements, and thus not interrogation for fIfth amend-
ment purposes." (citing United States v. Menichino, 497 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 
1974». 
201. Parra, 2 F.3d at 1068. 
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formation, the questioning constitutes interrogation subject to the 
strictures of Miranda."202 The court does not consider whether rou-
tine booking questions under other circumstances could also be sub-
ject to the strictures of Miranda. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit similarly considers sub-
jective factors when examining routine booking questions, although, 
unlike the Fourth Circuit, it includes an examination into the defen-
dant's subjective condition.203 Mter stating that Innis expanded the 
definition of interrogation beyond only questioning initiated by the 
police, the court concluded that "absent evidence that a defendant 
has particular susceptibility to the questioning or that the police used 
the booking questions to elicit incriminating statements from the de-
fendant, routine biographical questions are not ordinarily considered 
interrogation."204 Therefore, under this approach, any question to an 
arrestee about biographical information would not constitute interro-
gation unless the defendant made an affirmative showing that the po-
lice were trying to obtain incriminating information or that the 
arrestee was particularly susceptible to coercion.205 
202. Id. The court went on to say that, when the police officer's subjective intent 
is to elicit an incriminating response, the question is "reasonably likely to 
elicit incriminating information relevant to establishing an essential ele-
ment necessary for a conviction." Id. See also United States v. Villota-
Gomez, 994 F. Supp. 1322, 1334 (D. Kan. 1998) (citing Parra and conclud-
ing that the response to a question about the defendant's name should be 
suppressed because" [i]t is clear that SA Molina's questions to Perea-Vivas 
following his invocation of his right to remain silent were intended to elicit 
incriminating admissions ... "). 
203. United States v. Clark, 982 F.2d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1993). 
204. Id. But see United States v. Soto, 953 F.2d 263, 265 (6th Cir. 1992) ("Ab-
sence of intent to interrogate, while not irrelevant, is not determinative of 
whether police conduct constitutes interrogation."). The Clark court did 
not cite Soto and did not address this apparent inconsistency in the circuit's 
approach. Instead, it relied on an earlier decision, United States v. Avery, 717 
F.2d 1020, 1024 (6th Cir. 1983), which analyzed the subjective intent of the 
police. See also United States v. Broadus, 7 F.3d 460, 464 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(citing Avery, 717 F.2d at 1025, and quoting Clark, 982 F.2d at 968, for the 
proposition that routine booking questions are not interrogation "[a]bsent 
evidence that 'the police used the booking questions to elicit incriminating 
statements ... '''). The court also has not addressed the fact that routine 
booking questions are nonetheless" 'questioning initiated by law enforce-
ment officials,'" the definition of interrogation used in Miranda. Clark,982 
F.2d at 967-68 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444). 
205. See Avery, 717 F.2d at 1024 (admitting into evidence responses to biographi-
cal questions because "there is no evidence that the defendant was particu-
larly susceptible to these questions, or that the police somehow used the 
questions to elicit an incriminating response from the defendant"); see also 
Louisell v. Dir. ofIowa Dep't of Corrs., 178 F.3d 1019, 1023 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(While examining statements made during booking, the court noted, "In 
determining whether the statements were the result of an interrogation, we 
focus on Louisell's perception of the attending circumstances."); Villota-
Gomez, 994 F. Supp. at 1334 ("From the defendant's standpoint, these ques-
tions were clearly designed to elicit incriminating information. The fact 
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Several states also focus on the subjective intent of the police when 
considering the admissibility of responses to routine booking ques-
tions. Long before the Supreme Court decided Innis, Illinois courts 
had been inquiring into the intent of the investigator when consider-
ing the admissibility of statements made during booking procedures. 
In 1970, in recognizing a routine booking question exception, the Su-
preme Court of Illinois held that "[ t] he preliminary questions asked 
an accused with respect to his name and address, which are part of the 
booking proceedings certainly do not amount to an interrogation in 
order to elicit incriminating testimony or admissions from the defen-
dant."206 Following Innis, Illinois courts continued to regard the in-
tent of the police as determinative, rather than examining whether 
the question was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response.207 
Other states also consider the subjective intent of the police as de-
terminative. In holding that Miranda did not require warnings before 
booking, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals explained that 
"[t]he purpose of the questions was merely to obtain background in-
formation and not to elicit incriminating responses."208 One Florida 
court has held that "routine booking questions do not require Mi-
randa warnings because they are not designed to lead to an incrimi-
nating response; rather, they are designed to lead to essential 
biographical data."209 Finally, according to the courts in Connecticut, 
asking routine booking questions constitutes custodial interrogation, 
but does not require Miranda warnings because "the purpose of the 
questions [is] not to elicit an incriminating response. Rather, the pur-
pose [is] to gather the biographical data necessary to complete the 
booking procedure."210 
206. 
207. 
208. 
209. 
210. 
that the information obtained by that question was actually used in booking 
the defendant under his true name does not convince the court under the 
circumstances of this case that this mode of inquiry was part of a routine 
booking procedure."). 
People v. Fognini, 265 N.E.2d 133, 134 (Ill. 1970); see also People v. Dees, 
361 N.E.2d 1126, 1135-36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (listing criteria used to deter-
mine admissibility of responses to booking questions, including the intent 
of the police). 
People v. Davis, 431 N.E.2d 1210, 1213 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) ("[M]ere prelim-
inary questions with respect to an accused's name and address, which are 
part of the routine booking proceedings, do not amount to an interroga-
tion that can be described as designed to elicit incriminating testimony or 
admissions. It follows that no Miranda warnings were required."); see also 
People v. Stewart, 406 N.E.2d 53, 56 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (decided one day 
after Innis and holding that brief and routine booking questions by police 
are necessary and proper). . 
Gilbert v. State, 951 P.2d 98, 112 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997). 
Allred v. State, 622 So. 2d 984, 987 (Fla. 1993). 
State v. Tones, 656 A.2d 696, 701 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995); see also State v. 
Cuesta, 791 A.2d 686, 694 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that the purpose 
in asking the biographical question is the key to the analysis). But see State 
v. Evans, 523 A.2d 1306, 1314 (Conn. 1987) (citing Innis and stating that 
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The subjective intent approach to the routine booking question ex-
ception has thus found great favor with the lower courts, perhaps be-
cause it is easy to apply.211 In the unlikely event that a law 
enforcement officer admits at a suppression hearing that she in-
tended to elicit an incriminating response from a suspect by means of 
a booking question, the response to the booking question falls outside 
of the exception.212 If the officer does not admit that her question 
was designed to elicit an incriminating response, and the defendant 
cannot provide objective proof of the officer's underlying intent, the 
exception applies and the response is admissible.213 
The subjective approach poses significant dangers to the Fifth 
Amendment. Under this approach, the only hurdle to using an an-
swer to a booking question as evidence against an accused is the intent 
of the police officer. If the officer intends to elicit incriminating infor-
mation, the information is not admissible absent proof that the defen-
dant received Miranda warnings. 
The police may credibly state that they intended only to learn the 
suspect's address when they asked where the accused lived. This in-
tent is not inherently unlawful or wrong, but the question may pose 
several constitutional problems. Given the circumstances of the crime 
under investigation, the information already known to the police, and 
the circumstances of the arrest, that question could provide necessary 
evidence establishing the guilt of the accused and the police could 
know this when asking the question. 
For example, if the crime under investigation involves possession 
and the contraband was discovered at a certain address and the ac-
cused states that his or her address is where the contraband was 
found, the answer to an otherwise innocuous biographical question 
can establish an element of the offense.214 Despite the supposedly 
innocuous intent of the police, the individual's personal right to pro-
vide no testimonial evidence against himself or herself may be vio-
lated. If the suspect does not receive Miranda warnings before 
answering these questions, there is no assurance that the suspect has 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his or her Fifth Amendment rights. 
Citizenship is biographical information that is particularly sensitive 
now. A police officer may ask a suspect for immigration status or citi-
zenship, intending only to obtain biographical information for book-
the test whether a question is interrogation is objective, but also stating that 
the intent of the police is relevant and acknowledging that the police may 
use objectively neutral booking questions with the intent to elicit incrimi-
nating statements}; see also Ottis v. State, 496 S.E.2d 264, 268 (Ga. 1998) 
("Herman's testimony failed to reveal any evidence of intent to get the ac-
cused to make an incriminating statement in response."). 
211. See supra notes 193-210 and accompanying text. 
212. See supra notes 193-210 and accompanying text. 
213. See supra notes 193-210 and accompanying text. 
214. See United States v. Disla, 805 F.2d 1340, 1347 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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ing.215 The answer to that question, however, could lead to a suspect's 
indefinite incarceration and prosecution for unrelated crimes or im-
migration violations.216 Clearly this question could lead to serious vio-
lations of the individual's rights, although the question itself is not 
necessarily an inappropriate question for the government to ask. 217 
Therefore, an approach to the routine booking question exception 
that addresses more than just the police officer's intent is necessary to 
ensure the integrity of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 
B. The Innis-Based Approach: An Objective Assessment of the Likelihood of 
an Incriminating Response 
Many courts follow a more objective examination of routine book-
ing questions based on Innis's definition of the functional equivalent 
of interrogation.218 This approach asks whether the police reasonably 
should have known that the question would elicit an incriminating 
response.219 The theory behind this approach is that, regardless of 
whether a police officer intends to elicit inculpatory information, the 
questions may nonetheless create the risk of coerced self-incrimina-
tion that Miranda warnings were designed to eliminate.22o In Innis, 
the Supreme Court held that 
the term interrogation refers not only to express question-
ing, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police 
(other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) 
that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion 
of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of 
the suspect, rather than the intent of the police.221 
215. See, e.g., United States v. Salgado, 292 F.3d 1169, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2002). 
216. Id. 
217. See generally LAWYERS COMMITI'EE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, A YEAR OF Loss: REEX. 
AMINING CIVIL LIBERTIES SINCE SEPTEMBER 11 (2002), (discussing recent in-
fringements on constitutional and civil rights, particularly of non-citizens, 
in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks), available at http:/ / 
www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/loss/loss_main.htm. 
218. See infra notes 219-48 and accompanying text. 
219. See, e.g., United States v. McLaughlin, 777 F.2d 388, 391-92 (8th Cir. 1985); 
State v. Mack, 345 S.E.2d 223, 225 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986). Professor White 
has found commentators' iterations of the "reasonably likely to elicit" test 
as early as a 1966 conference. See Welsh S. White, Interrogation Without Ques-
tions: Rhode Island v. Innis and United States v. Henry, 78 MICH. L. REv. 
1209, 1229 n.137 (1980) (citing Henry B. Rothblatt & Robert M. Pitler, 
Police Interrogation: Warnings and Waivers-Where Do We Go from Here?, 42 No· 
TRE DAME LAWYER 479,486 n.42 (1967». 
220. See Mills v. State, 278 Md. 262, 273-74, 363 A.2d 491, 497 (1976) (pointing 
out the flaws in a subjective approach). 
221. 446 U.S. 291, 292 (1980). 
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The plurality in Muniz demonstrated that it considered this language 
relevant to booking questions by quoting this and other language 
from Innis. 222 
Although courts often rely on this language in discussing routine 
booking questions, the language does not provide a clear framework 
for analysis.223 Most fundamentally, the language does not appear to 
contemplate the idea that a question "normally attendant to arrest 
and custody" may also be "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response."224 Notwithstanding this ambiguity, lower courts "have in-
terpreted Innis to mean that the routine booking question exception 
does not apply if a police officer knows, or should know, that a routine 
booking question, although innocuous on its face, is reasonably likely 
to evoke an incriminating answer."225 
Under this approach, not every question about biographical infor-
mation automatically qualifies for the routine booking question ex-
ception.226 The determination is made on a case-by-case basis because 
"[e]ven a relatively innocuous question may, in light of the unusual 
susceptibility of a particular suspect, be reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response."227 Also, "[Q]uestions colorably administra-
tive in nature may constitute a custodial interrogation if they are ob-
jectively likely to elicit an incriminating response."228 
Several factors inform whether the questioner should have known 
that the question was likely to elicit an incriminating response.229 
Many courts consider the nature of the information or the nature of 
the question.230 Some courts limit the statements admissible under 
this exception to the most basic form of identifYing data, like name 
and address, excluding more detailed background information like 
criminal record, drug use, or employment history.231 Some courts 
222. 496 U.S. 582, 600-01 (1990) (Brennan, j., plurality opinion); if. Illinois v. 
Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) (holding that a defendant's voluntary state-
ments are admissible even though he was not aware that he was speaking to 
a law enforcement officer). 
223. See supra section II.A. 
224. See Hughes v. State, 346 Md. 80, 91, 695 A.2d 132, 138 (1997). "Indeed, the 
Court in Innis appears to have had booking inquiries in mind when it ex-
cluded from its definition of 'interrogation' those words and actions 'nor-
mally attendant to arrest and custody.'" WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. 
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.7, 504 (West 1984). 
225. See Hughes, 346 Md. at 91,695 A.2d at 138. 
226. United States v. Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing 
United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1238 (9th Cir. 1981». 
227. Booth, 669 F.2d at 1238 (citing Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 n.8). 
228. State v. Rossignol, 627 A.2d 524, 526 (Me. 1993). 
229. See, e.g., United States v. Minkowitz, 889 F. Supp. 624, 627 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). 
230. See, e.g., id. 
231. Id. (relying on United States ex rel. Hines v. LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109, 1113 
(2d Cir. 1975) and United States v. Burns, 684 F.2d 1066, 1076 (2d Cir. 
1982»; see also State v. Ballard, 439 A.2d 1375, 1383-84 (R.I. 1982) (permit-
ting the response to "What is your name?" because that question is not 
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limit the questions subject to this exception to those inquiring into 
the information required for a booking form. 232 For example, in Ma-
ryland, for the exception to apply, "the questions must be directed 
toward securing 'simple identification information of the most basic 
sort;' that is to say, only questions aimed at accumulating 'basic identi-
tying data required for booking and arraignment' fall within this 
exception. "233 
Often, courts will examine whether the question, albeit inquiring 
into identifYing or biographical information, is relevant to the crime 
under investigation in order to decide if the officer should have 
known the question was likely to lead to an incriminating state-
ment.234 Furthermore, "where a purportedly routine booking ques-
tion provides some proof of an element of the crime for which the 
232. 
233. 
234. 
"reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response" (quoting Innis, 446 
U.S. at 301). 
See State v. Echevarria, 422 So. 2d 53, 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding 
that the question "Who hit you?" was not covered by the booking question 
exception although it took place while the defendant was being booked); 
see also State v. Sargent, 762 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Wash. 1988) ("While it is well 
established that routine booking procedures do not call for Miranda warn-
ings, this court recently held that a question which is not necessary for 
booking the defendant is interrogation for Miranda purposes."); State v. 
Walton, 824 P.2d 533,535 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) ("A question which is not 
required for booking purposes is 'interrogation' for Miranda purposes." (al-
teration in original». 
Hughes v. State, 346 Md. 80, 94-95, 695 A.2d 132, 139 (1997) (quoting 
LaVallee, 521 F.2d at 1113 & n.2); see also Commonwealth v. Guerrero, 588 
N.E.2d 716,719 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (finding that information regarding 
"name, age, address, next of kin, weight, height, [and] eye color ... is 
pertinent ... to the custodial responsibilities of the police[,]" but that 
'[t]he relevance of occupation and employment to those responsibilities is 
less immediately obvious, and, in light of the Muniz decision, it will be pref-
erable, unless Miranda warnings are repeated prior to booking, to scrub 
questions about employment status from the booking ritual"). 
See United States v. Gill, 879 F. Supp. 149, 152 (D. Me. 1995) (finding that 
the police officer should not have known that the defendant's place of 
birth, given while the defendant was being driven to the jail, would be in-
criminating because the officer "had no reason to believe that Gill's place 
of birth was even tangentially an issue in the investigation"); United States 
v. McLaughlin, 777 F.2d 388, 391-92 (8th Cir. 1985) ("Only if the govern-
ment agent should reasonably be aware that the information sought, while 
merely for basic identification purposes in the usual case, is directly rele-
vant to the substantive offense charged, will the questioning be subject to 
scrutiny."); Thompson v. United States, 821 F. Supp. 110, 121 (W.D.N.Y. 
1993) (holding that questions regarding citizenship were not exempt from 
Miranda during the booking of suspects of "an undercover drug operation 
targeting illegal alien Jamaican nationals"); People v. Rodney, 648 N.E.2d 
471,474 (N.Y. 1995) (analyzing whether a defendant's employment history 
is a "pedigree" question subject to the exception laid out in Muniz because 
it is not '''reasonably related to [the] administrative concerns'" of custody 
(quoting Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601-02». 
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suspect is arrested, the booking question exception will be less likely 
to apply."235 
Questions about citizenship often run afoul of this inquiry, as they 
may be closely connected to the crime under investigation and there-
fore reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. For exam-
ple, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that, in a case 
involving people apprehended on the high seas and found to have 
drugs in their possession, questions about citizenship are not covered 
by a routine booking question exception to Miranda. 236 
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that 
the routine booking question exception "is inapplicable ... where the 
elicitation of information regarding immigration status is reasonably 
likely to inculpate the respondent."237 Because questions regarding 
immigration status often are directly related to an element of a crime, 
an investigator should know that these questions are likely to elicit an 
incriminating response and are therefore considered investigatory 
and are not exempt from Miranda. 238 The court stated: 
When a police officer has reason to know that a suspect's 
answer may incriminate him, however, even routine ques-
tioning may amount to interrogation. Thus, while there is 
usually nothing objectionable about asking a detainee his 
place of birth, the same question assumes a completely dif-
ferent character when an INS agent asks it of a person he 
suspects is an illegal alien.239 
The police officer's experience or knowledge can lead to the con-
clusion that an otherwise routine biographical question is reasonably 
likely to lead to an incriminating response. For example, depending 
on other information available to the investigator, questions about res-
idence could be reasonably likely to lead to evidence of an element of 
a crime, and therefore would fit the definition of interrogation used 
by the courts that follow the objective test based on Innis. For exam-
ple, after finding a large quantity of cocaine at an apartment and ask-
ing neighbors for a description of the residents, then arresting 
someone near the apartment who met the description, indicates that 
235. 
236. 
237. 
238. 
239. 
Hughes, 346 Md. at 95, 695 A.2d at 140. 
United States v. Doe, 878 F.2d 1546, 1551-52 (lst Cir. 1989) (noting that 
"[w]hen, or whether, the United States can prosecute a person found on 
such a ship is not immediately obvious; and the possibility that prosecution 
will turn upon citizenship is great enough (and should be well enough 
known to those in the drug enforcement world) that Coast Guard officers 
ought to know that answers to such questions may incriminate"). 
United States v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 1990). 
[d. at 1046-47; see also United States v. Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d 1277, 1279 
(9th Cir. 1983) (holding that an INS agent with 23 years of experience had 
reason to know that an admission regarding alienage, "coupled with the 
evidence of firearms possession, could lead to federal prosecution"). 
United States v. Henley, 984 F.2d 1040, 1042 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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the investigating officer "should have known that the question regard-
ing . . . residence was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating re-
sponse .... [T]he question as to where [the defendant] lived was 
related to an element (possession) of the crime that [the officer] had 
reason to suspect [the defendant] committed."240 
Likewise, when an officer has background knowledge about a sus-
pect and a victim, this background information will influence whether 
the officer should know that the questioning is reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response.241 In this situation, a Florida district 
court noted: 
There can be no question that [the officer], armed with the 
information he already possessed, and not having informed 
the defendant that he was under arrest for murder, should 
have known that his background questions regarding the de-
fendant's trip from Cuba and his past employment were rea-
sonably likely to result in an incriminating response. At the 
very least, he was likely to obtain, as he did, confirmation of 
[the defendant's] associations with the victim and another 
suspect in the murder.242 
Many courts state that the police officer's intent or investigatory 
purpose is relevant, but not conclusive, to determining whether the 
question is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.243 
Under this approach, the police officer's intent is clearly secondary, 
and "the test for determining reasonable likelihood of incrimination 
'focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than 
the intent of the police.' "244 
Another factor that many courts consider is the context of the ques-
tioning. Some courts permit questioning about biographical informa-
tion under any circumstances.245 Others require the questioning to 
240. United States v. Disla, 805 F.2d 1340, 1347 (9th Cir. 1986). 
241. State v. Madruga:Jiminez, 485 So. 2d 462, 463-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
242. Id. at 464. 
243. See, e.g., United States v. Minkowitz, 889 F. Supp. 624, 627.(E.D.N.Y. 1995). 
244. Id. at 629 (quoting Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601); see also United States v. Ventura, 
85 F.3d 708, 711 (1st Cir. 1996) ("Again, the inquiry is objective: how would 
the officer's statements and conduct be perceived by a reasonable person 
in the same circumstances?"); United States v. Taylor, 985 F.2d 3,7 (1st Cir. 
1993) ("The 'functional equivalence' test does not turn on the subjective 
intent of the particular police officer but on an objective assessment as to 
whether the police statements and conduct would be perceived as interro-
gation by a reasonable person in the same circumstances."); People v. An-
derson, 837 P.2d 293, 296 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that "the 
question of whether an officer's words or actions are 'reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response' must be viewed from the perspective of 
the suspect"); Mitchell v. United States, 746 A.2d 877, 891 (D.C. 2000) 
("The test ... is an objective one .... "). 
245. See United States v. Edwards, 885 F.2d 377, 384-85 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding 
that answers to identification questions asked at the time of arrest were 
admissible despite the lack of Miranda warnings because the same questions 
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be after arrest and at the police station during formal booking.246 Still 
others consider whether the questioning occurred during booking 
procedures as relevant, among other factors, in weighing whether the 
officers should have known that the question was reasonably likely to 
lead to an incriminating response.247 In rejecting a prosecution argu-
ment that incriminating information was admissible under the rou-
tine booking question exception, the Ninth Circuit explained: 
[T]he questioning conducted by [the investigator] had little, 
if any, resemblance to routine booking proce-
dures .... [B]ooking is essentially a clerical procedure, oc-
curring soon after the suspect arrives at the police 
station. . . . [T] hree factors . . . indicate [] that the chal-
lenged questioning was not booking: (1) the government 
agency involved does not ordinarily book suspects, (2) a true 
booking had already occurred and the agency had access to 
would be asked during booking and then would be deemed admissible); 
State v. Smith, 785 So. 2d 815, 818 (La. 2001) ("Because the officer's field 
interview asked for no more information than an individual might supply 
in response to booking questions as a routine incident of an arrest, [the 
officer's] inquiries did not amount to interrogation for Miranda pur-
poses."). But see United States v. Ortiz, 835 F. Supp. 824, 835 (E.D. Pa. 
1993) (holding that the Muniz exception applies only if the individual is 
being booked); State v. Stevens, 511 N.W.2d 591,599 (Wis. 1994) (adopting 
the routine booking question exception but refusing to extend the excep-
tion to questions asked at the time of the arrest). 
246. Ortiz, 835 F. Supp. at 835 ("But the premise of the Muniz plurality was that 
the defendant was already subject to 'booking' and therefore such 'bio-
graphical data' was not investigatory and, thus, was exempt from Miranda's 
application. The ordinary English usage of the verb to book means that the 
defendant is already arrested. That is to say, he could not have been booked 
unless he was arrested, and if such 'routine booking questions' are to re-
ceive the Muniz vaccine they must be made as part of a lawful arrest."); 
Stevens, 511 N.W.2d at 599 (refusing to apply the routine booking question 
exception to questions asked during an arrest and holding, "[T]his court 
will not extend the exception to incriminating questions asked at the time 
of the arrest"). 
247. See Pirtle v. Lambert, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1090-91 (E.D. Wash. 2001) 
(considering whether the question was asked while the defendant was be-
ing arrested and held face down on the ground-rather than in a police 
station while being booked-as definitive in determining that the question-
ing was interrogation); see also United States v, Disla, 805 F.2d 1340, 1347 
(9th Cir. 1986) ("The questioning here did not arise in a routine 'booking' 
setting. . .. In light of both the context of the questioning and the content 
of the question, we must conclude that Disla was subjected to interroga-
tion."); Lester v. State, 332 S.E.2d 31, 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) ("Merelyask-
ing a suspect for his name and for identification during booking are not 
questions reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses."); State v. 
Ketchum, 34 P.3d 1006, 1027 (Haw. 2001) (considering relevant that "the 
information was not gathered in a traditional station house or other formal 
booking station ... "). 
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the information obtained, and (3) the questionin~ occurred 
well after the suspect was placed in custody .... ' 48 
The focus on the reasonable likelihood of eliciting an incriminating 
response, rather than the subjective intent of the police officers, al-
lows for more protection for an individual's Fifth Amendment rights. 
It allows for more attention to the policies behind Miranda, thus 
preventing the police from using the coercive nature of confinement 
to extract confessions. Regardless of the subjective intent of the po-
lice, a booking question-or the circumstances under which it is 
asked-may result in a situation where the booking question is reason-
ably likely to elicit an incriminating response, or the police should 
have known that the question was reasonably likely to elicit an incrimi-
nating response even though it was a colorably administrative ques-
tion. Instead of looking at the single factor of the police officer's 
intent, this approach examines many more factors, such as the nature 
of the crime and the circumstances of the questioning, before decid-
ing whether the question violates the Fifth Amendment. 
C. The Hybrid Approach: A Reasonable Person's View of the Officer'S Intent 
A minority of jurisdictions apply a hybrid approach to the routine 
booking question exception, which is not strictly drawn from either 
the Innis majority or the Muniz plurality. Under this approach, the 
relevant question is whether an objective observer would conclude 
that the police intended to elicit incriminating information.249 
The hybrid approach also has its genesis in Innis, and has received 
considerable support from commentators. In his dissent in Innis, Jus-
tice Stevens proposed an alternative standard in lieu of the majority's 
"should have known" standard: "[AJny police conduct or statements 
that would appear to a reasonable person in the suspect's position to 
call for a response must be considered 'interrogation.' "250 Justice Ste-
vens referred to his proposed standard as objective,251 and considered 
it to include "[sJtatements that appear to call for a response from the 
suspect, as well as those that are designed to do SO."252 Justice Stevens 
248. United States v. Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1983). In-
deed, United States Pretrial Services Office, the agency that obtains infor-
mation for arraignment and detention review for federal courts, includes a 
promise to the accused not to use the information it obtains in a prosecu-
tion against him or her. See United States Pretrial Services Office at http:// 
www.vaept.uscourts.gov/defendant/inv.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004) 
(Providing information to defendants including that the information the 
defendant provides a pretrial services officer will not be used as evidence 
regarding the charges against him or her). 
249. White, supra note 62, at 1232. 
250. 446 U.S. at 311 (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
251. Id. at 311 n.10 (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
252. Id. at 311 (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
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drew his proposed test from, or at least shared its conception with, an 
article on the case written by Professor Welsh White.253 
Despite the fact that Justice Stevens was the sole justice in Innis to 
adopt this analysis, several commentators have adopted this hybrid ap-
proach as the proper reading of the Innis majority standard. Shortly 
after Innis, Professor White argued that "the best reading of the Innis 
test is that it turns upon the objective purpose manifested by the po-
lice."254 He proposed framing the test as follows: "[I]f an objective 
observer (with the same knowledge of the suspect as the police of-
ficer) would, on the sole basis of hearing the officer's remarks, infer 
that the remarks were designed to elicit an incriminating response, 
then the remarks should constitute 'interrogation."'255 Professors 
Lafave and Israel have adopted Professor White's interpretation of 
Innis in their treatises.256 
A few courts have adopted the hybrid analysis advocated by the 
commentators. Virginia, for example, has settled on an interpretation 
of Innis that requires "a determination [of] whether an objective ob-
server would view an officer's words or actions as designed to elicit an 
incriminating response."257 Massachusetts' intermediate courts have, 
on occasion, applied the hybrid approach to evaluate "whether an ob-
jective observer would infer that [a question] was designed to elicit an 
incriminating response."258 The Florida Supreme Court has held that 
253. Id. at 312 n.12 (Stevens, j., dissenting) (discussing Welsh S. White, Rhode 
Island v. Innis: The Significance of a Suspect's Assertion of His Right to Counsel, 
17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 53, 68 (1979». 
254. White, supra note 62, at 1231. 
255. White, supra note 62, at 1232. 
256. LAFAVE, supra note 224, § 6.7(a), at 502-03,506,511. 
257. Blain v. Commonwealth, 371 S.E.2d 838, 841 (Va. Ct. App. 1988); see also 
Timbers v. Commonwealth, 503 S.E.2d 233, 237 (Va. Ct. App. 1998). Both 
of these cases are from Virginia's intermediate court; the Supreme Court of 
Virginia has not spoken on the topic. 
258. Commonwealth v. Chadwick, 664 N.E.2d 874,876 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996); see 
also Commonwealth v. D'Entremont, 632 N.E.2d 1239, 1242 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1994); Commonwealth v. Kacavich, 550 N.E.2d 397, 397 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1990); Commonwealth v. Rubio, 540 N.E.2d 189, 193 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1989); if. Commonwealth v. Torres, 678 N.E.2d 847, 851 n.7 (Mass. 1997) 
(acknowledging the existence of Professor White's hybrid test without com-
ment). Massachusetts, like many other jurisdictions, has been less than uni-
form in its application of the standards developed in Innis and Muniz. Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Rise, 744 N.E.2d 66, 72 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) ("In order 
for the response to booking question [sic] to be compelled, the booking 
question must be designed or reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response."). Although the Massachusetts high court has reversed a trial 
court's suppression of a suspect's response on the basis that its inquiry fo-
cused too heavily on the officer's intent, see Tarres, 678 N.E.2d at 851, it has 
also repeatedly inquired into whether booking questions are designed to 
elicit incriminating responses. See Commonwealth v. Woods, 645 N.E.2d 
1153, 1157 (Mass. 1995); Commonwealth v. Chipman, 635 N.E.2d 1204, 
1211 (Mass. 1994); Commonwealth v. Acosta, 627 N.E.2d 466, 469 (Mass. 
1993). 
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interrogation occurs "when a person is subjected to express questions, 
or other words or actions, by a state agent, that a reasonable person 
would conclude are designed to lead to an incriminating response."259 
IV. STANDARDS COURTS SHOULD APPLY TO ROUTINE BOOK-
ING QUESTIONS 
The existence of a routine booking question exception to Miranda, 
although not endorsed by a majority of the Supreme Court, has be-
come a fixture of Fifth Amendmentjurisprudence.26o This exception, 
however, is not necessary to ensure that the government learns the 
information essential for custody. Miranda is no bar to the govern-
ment's ability to obtain this information. In excluding statements 
made after a defendant invoked his Miranda rights, the Court of Ap-
peals of Michigan stated, "This is not to say that police may not seek to 
obtain information vital to the care and health of a person taken into 
custody, including necessary information on possible drug use."261 
When the questions seeking this information are asked after a defen-
dant has received Miranda warnings and invoked those rights, how-
ever, the information is inadmissible.262 Admitting this information 
into evidence "would be to encourage the subverting of an accused's 
constitutional right to remain silent under the guise of obtaining 
statements purely for his own benefit."263 
Generally, however, courts do not agree with the approach de-
scribed above. The routine booking question exception appears to be 
here to stay. No current approach to this exception, standing alone, 
guarantees that an accused who has not knowingly and voluntarily 
waived his or her rights, will not be required to testifY against him or 
herself in a criminal trial. The three approaches focus on whether the 
questioning constitutes interrogation based on Innis and Muniz, but 
this is only the initial inquiry. While it is true that statements made 
during a custodial interrogation without pre-issued Miranda warnings 
are inadmissible, a constitutional evaluation of background or bio-
graphical questions requires further inquiry. 
Analysis of this exception must begin with the questioning itself. 
Because the questions are "booking questions," clearly they are asked 
in a custodial context.264 Accordingly, the second tier of analysis of 
259. Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 966 n.17 (Fla. 1992); see also State v. Ed-
wards, 661 So. 2d 865, 866 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Traylor, 596 
So. 2d at 966 n.17). . 
260. See supra Part I.B. 
261. People v. Hooper, 270 N.W.2d 518, 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978). 
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
264. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (holding that the Fifth Amendment applies to 
interrogations that occur when the suspect is in "custody or otherwise de-
prived of his freedom of action in any significant way"); see also Berkemer v. 
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440-42 (1984) (determining that custody for Mi-
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Innis, whether the question is reasonably likely to lead to incriminat-
ing information, should be irrelevant. Because a routine booking 
question is a direct question, it is a custodial interrogation and thus is 
subject to traditional Fifth Amendment analysis. As such, an answer to 
a booking question should be admissible only if voluntary. 
Although the best assurance that a statement is made to the police 
voluntarily is if it is made after Miranda warnings were given, almost 
every jurisdiction has admitted into evidence answers to these ques-
tions even in the absence of these warnings.265 Although the govern-
ment needs certain biographical information attendant to jailing 
suspects, that need does not justify ignoring the policies behind Mi-
randa. The second level of analysis under Innis informs whether the 
questions violate the policies behind Miranda. 266 
Most importantly, this exception must be narrowly applied in order 
to ensure that the Fifth Amendment is not ignored. At a minimum, 
this exception must be applied only when the question is asked during 
actual booking-in the police station, while filling out forms that are 
seeking information that is actually attendant to arrest and custody. 
"Field booking" or other questioning that is not directly related to 
custody should not fall within this exception, even if the topic of the 
questioning is biographical information. 
Similarly, the exception must be limited to basic biographical infor-
mation, such as name, address, height, and weight. Any attempt to 
use this exception for more extensive questioning is not consistent 
with the justification for the exception.267 
If the question is reasonably likely to lead to an incriminating re-
sponse, the question, albeit routine, should not be permitted in the 
absence of Miranda warnings. Likewise, if the police should know that 
the question is likely to lead to an incriminating response, it should 
not be permitted without warnings.268 In addition, courts should not 
permit routine booking questions that are designed to elicit incrimi-
nating information without first requiring Miranda warnings. 
A. The Questioning Must Occur During Booking 
In order for questioning to fall within the routine booking question 
exception to Miranda, the questioning must occur during booking. 
Although this seems a rather obvious point, too many jurisdictions ig-
randa purposes may occur before formal arrest, but that the curtailment of 
a suspect's freedom of action necessary to trigger Miranda is the "functional 
equivalent of formal arrest"). 
265. See LAFAVE, 2 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.7(b) (2d ed. 1999). 
266. See supra section II.A. 
267. See Muniz, 496 U.S. at 592-600 (discussing whether the answer to the sixth 
birthday question was testimonial and concluding that it was). 
268. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-02. 
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nore this basic limitation.269 This requirement, however, is essential 
both as common sense and as most consistent with the reasons for the 
exception expressed by the Supreme Court. 
In Muniz, Justice Brennan described the routine booking question 
exception as exempting "from Miranda's coverage questions to secure 
the biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial seroices."27o 
Thus, questions that are "requested for record-keeping purposes only" 
fall within the exception.271 
Questions that police ask for routine administrative purposes are 
not the sort at which Miranda was aimed. The policy behind Miranda 
focused on protecting individuals from police abusing the coercive 
nature of custody to extract confessions,272 not the administrative con-
cerns of operating jails or administering pre-trial services.273 The 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit justified the routine booking 
question exception on the grounds that, in Miranda, "the Supreme 
Court was concerned with protecting the suspect against interrogation 
of an investigative nature rather than the obtaining of basic identify-
ing data required for booking and arraignment."2 4 The exception 
was carved out from Miranda's ambit in order "to facilitate the admin-
istrative duties of the police at the station house."275 In order to be 
consistent with Muniz and the purposes behind Miranda, any question 
asked outside the booking process, and not directly tied to assisting in 
administering booking and custody, should not fall within the routine 
booking question exception.276 
Miranda was aimed at protecting suspects from a wide variety of pos-
sible abuses of the interrogation process, and Innis served to broaden 
those protections by clarifying the extent of the definition of interro-
gation.277 Courts should therefore keep the routine booking question 
exception on as tight a leash as possible. Doing so will prevent the 
exception from being used as a post hoc justification for asking a su-
perficially benign question in exactly the sort of circumstances that 
269. See State v. Smith, 785 So. 2d 815, 817-18 (La. 2001) (admitting into evi-
dence identifying data collected during a "field interview" of the suspect); 
see also United States v. Edwards, 885 F.2d 377, 385 (7th Cir. 1989) (admit-
ting into evidence data gathered during a field interrogation on the 
grounds that the same questions would eventually be asked during book-
ing, when they would fall within the routine booking question exception). 
270. 496 U.S. at 601 (internal quotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
271. Id. 
272. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1987). 
273. See People v. Abdelmassih, 577 N.E.2d 861, 864 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) 
(describing Muniz as exempting from Miranda routine booking questions 
that are "asked to secure biographical data reasonably related to the po-
lice's administrative concerns"). 
274. United States ex rel. Hines v. LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (2d Cir. 
1975). 
275. Jones v. United States, 779 A.2d 277, 290 (D.C. 2001) (Mack,]., dissenting). 
276. See id. (Mack,]., dissenting). 
277. See Mauro, 481 U.S. at 526. 
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led the Court to conclude that custodial interrogations were inher-
ently coercive.278 
Just such a situation happened in Pirtle v. Lamberf79 in the state of 
Washington.28o Officers in the Spokane sheriff's department appre-
hended a murder suspect and asked the suspect whether he knew why 
he was under arrest. 281 He responded by stating, "Of course I do, you 
might as well shoot me now."282 The state argued that the question 
was routine and asked without an investigatory interest.283 The court 
disagreed, contrasting a booking setting with the actual circumstances 
of the questioning: an "inherently coercive environment created by 
being held face and stomach down on the ground with a gun pointed 
at his head and under a threat of being shot if he didn't 
"284 cooperate .... 
Limiting the routine booking question exception to questions asked 
during booking is a fundamentally clear-cut way for courts to assess 
routine booking questions. Not only is it consistent with the Supreme 
Court's iteration of the exception in Muniz, but it is an easily applied 
bright line test. The bright line, however, is not arbitrary. To the 
contrary, the bright line sheds light on whether the police were acting 
with an investigatory purpose or responding to their administrative, 
record-keeping needs. It also indicates whether the questioning oc-
curred under the sort of coercive circumstances that Miranda in-
tended to target. 
The first question a court should ask in assessing a routine booking 
question case is whether the questioning occurred during booking. If 
it did not, the inquiry should end, the exception should not apply, 
and a straightforward Fifth Amendment analysis should follow. If it 
did, the court must examine the questioning in more detail. 
B. The Questioning Must Be Limited to Biographical Data 
Once a court has satisfied itself that the questioning occurred in an 
administrative booking context, the court should examine the content 
of the questioning. Muniz permits only questions regarding biograph-
ical data that are directly related to the administration of the jail. 285 
Several courts have identified the limited scope of biographical infor-
278. 
279. 
280. 
281. 
282. 
283. 
284. 
285. 
See State v. Ketchum, 34 P.3d 1006, 1025 (Haw. 2001) (holding that the 
officer's asking the defendant his address, having found him in bed early in 
the morning, and trying to justifY admitting it into evidence on the ground 
that it was a routine identification question was a "post hoc rationalization of 
his having elicited an incriminating admission"). 
150 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (E.D. Wash. 2001). 
150 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (E.D. Wash. 2001). 
Id. at 1083, 1091. 
Id. at 1091. 
Id. 
Id. at 1090-91. 
See 496 U.S. at 601. 
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mation that should be covered by this exception: height, weight, ad-
dress, age, date of birth, race,· and social security number.286 
Essentially, only questions asking for basic identification information 
are covered by the exception. 
Like the inquiry into the context of the questioning, inquiring into 
the content of the questioning provides courts with a straightforward 
rule of thumb for determining whether a question is exempt from 
Miranda under the routine booking question exception. Simple bio-
graphical data may be covered, but questions seeking more broadly 
defined information are not. 
This limitation on content is necessary to curb the possibility of po-
lice abuses of administrative procedures.287 Although recognizing a 
need for police to gather biographical data, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court stated that it was cognizant of the fact that the booking question 
exception could be abused by "law enforcement officers who might, 
under the guise of seeking objective or neutral information, deliber-
ately elicit an incriminating statement from a suspect."288 
The basis for this limitation on content thus has its roots in Innis: 
Questions about simple biographical information are unlikely to elicit 
incriminating responses. "[T]he rationale for creating an exemption 
to Miranda for questions asked during booking is that these questions 
are generally unrelated to the crime and are therefore unlikely to 
elicit an incriminating response .... "289 Questions seeking biographi-
cal information tend to be "'non-investigative' questions not designed 
to investigate crimes or the involvement of the arrested person or 
others in crimes."290 The purpose of asking a defendant for his or her 
name, address, height, weight, and age is not to elicit an incriminating 
response, but is to "gather the biographical data necessary to com-
plete the booking procedure."291 
Questions that exceed the scope of this basic biographical data can 
demonstrate a deliberate attempt to elicit incriininating information. 
For example, asking an individual who is suspected of drug distribu-
tion about his employment status does not fall within the routine 
booking question exception because that question can lead to an in-
286. See, e.g., Varner v. State, 418 So. 2d 961,962 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982); Franks 
v. State, 486 S.E.2d 594, 597 (Ga. 1997). 
287. See United States v. Minkowitz, 889 F. Supp. 624, 627 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) ("The 
first factor that a court should consider is the nature of the information 
being sought. Recognizing the possibility of abuse by police, the Second 
Circuit has emphasized the need to limit the pedigree exception to simple 
identification information of the most basic sort." (internal quotation 
omitted». 
288. State v. Evans, 523 A.2d 1306, 1314 (Conn. 1987) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
289. Franks, 486 S.E.2d at 597. 
290. Varner, 418 So. 2d at 962. 
291. State v. Jones, 656 A.2d 696, 701 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995). 
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criminating response, as unemployment can be linked to a motive to 
distribute drugs.292 Likewise, asking an injured suspect, "Who hit 
you?" is reasonably likely to lead to an incriminating response and is 
therefore not exempted from Miranda simply because asked during 
booking.293 Questioning a suspect about their name, height, or 
weight is easily distinguished from questions regarding an obvious in-
jury; the former facilitates the booking process, while the latter is 
likely to lead to an incriminating response.294 
Limiting the content of the questions that are covered by the rou-
tine booking question exception is a simple and straightforward way 
for a court to ensure that the question is aimed at administrative, re-
cord-keeping purposes rather than a substantive investigation of the 
crime. This limitation, however, does not end the inquiry. The courts 
must examine other circumstances surrounding the questioning to 
ensure that applying the routine booking question is just and consis-
tent with the Fifth Amendment. 
C. The Objective, Innis-Based Approach Is the Most Consistent With 
Miranda 
Once a court is satisfied that the questioning occurred in an admin-
istrative, booking setting, and that the content of the questions sought 
only basic biographical information, the court must then examine the 
questioning in more depth before being assured that the question sat-
isfies the strictures of the Fifth Amendment. Not every question about 
biographical data should qualifY for the exception automatically; if a 
police officer knows or should know that a routine booking question 
is likely to elicit an incriminating response, that question violates the 
rules established in Muniz and Innis. 
Many routine booking question cases that apply this Innis-based def-
inition of interrogation incorrectly hold that not all direct questions 
by law enforcement officers constitute interrogation; they hold that 
only those direct questions that are reasonably likely to elicit an in-
criminating response are an interrogation requiring Miranda warn-
ings.295 Despite the flaw in that basic premise, this standard is 
instructive for courts to assess whether an otherwise routine booking 
question asked during a routine booking should nonetheless require 
Miranda warnings. Under all the circumstances in a given case, if the 
routine booking question is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response, the question is likely to involve the investigatory, psychologi-
292. See Commonwealth v. White, 663 N.E.2d 834, 844 (Mass. 1996). 
293. State v. Echevarria, 422 So. 2d 53,54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). The answer 
to this question was that the man the suspect had killed had hit him. [d. 
294. Franks, 486 S.E.2d at 597. 
295. E.g., United States v. McLaughlin, 777 F.2d 388, 391 (8th Cir. 1985); State v. 
Evans, 523 A.2d 1306, 1314 (Conn. 1987). 
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cal ploys and coercive tone that the Supreme Court intended Miranda 
to address.296 
Consistent with the case law and policies behind the Fifth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, the routine booking question exception should 
not apply when, under the facts and circumstance of a given case, a 
question is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response or the 
law enforcement officer should know that the questions are likely to 
elicit an incriminating response. Like the two other criteria discussed 
above, this condition for applying the routine booking question ex-
ception guards against abuses by the police and ensures that the ques-
tioning is directed at administrative, record-keeping concerns rather 
than investigatory interests.297 
When attempting to ensure that the questioning is targeted to ad-
ministrative concerns, courts should be particularly sensitive to the de-
signs of the police. When the police intend to elicit an incriminating 
response, they are more likely to be taking advantage of the coercive 
nature of the interrogation. As the Ninth Circuit explained, "we rec-
ognize the potential for abuse by law enforcement officers who might, 
under the guise of seeking 'objective' or 'neutral' information, delib-
erately elicit an incriminating statement from a suspect."298 Thus, 
"[ Q] uestions designed to elicit incriminating admissions are not cov-
ered under the routine booking question exception."299 Any question 
that is designed to elicit an incriminating response, of course, falls 
within the Innis-based limitation on the exception: it is both reasona-
bly likely to elicit incriminating information and the police officer 
should know that it is likely to elicit incriminating information. 
Finally, the analysis should also account for any particular suscepti-
bilities of the suspect. Because the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination is a personal right of the accused, the perceptions 
of the accused are a necessary element in determining whether the 
accused has been subjected to undue coercive influences. Moreover, 
296. 
297. 
298. 
299. 
See United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1237-38 (9th Cir. 1981) (explain-
ing that questions that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating re-
sponse involve the psychological intimidation that Miranda was aimed to 
prevent). When assessing the reasonable likelihood of an incriminating re-
sponse, courts should account for the nature of the crime under investiga-
tion, the facts and circumstances known to the investigating officer, and the 
circumstances of the questioning. See id. at 1238. 
See United States v. Minkowitz, 889 F. Supp. 624, 626-27 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). 
Booth, 669 F.2d at 1238. 
United States v. Virgen-Moreno, 265 F.3d 276, 293-94 (5th Cir. 2001); see 
also United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[W]here 
questions regarding normally routine biographical information are de-
signed to elicit incriminating information, the questioning constitutes in-
terrogation subject to the strictures of Miranda."); United States v. Doe, 878 
F.2d 1546, 1551 (1st Cir. 1989) ("The cases that create this exception, how-
ever, note that it does not apply where the law enforcement officer, under 
the guise of asking for background information, seeks to elicit information 
that may incriminate."). 
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the Miranda jurisprudence is focused on protecting individuals from 
psychological ploys and the undue coercion found in custodial situa-
tions. If certain personal characteristics of the suspect would make 
him or her more likely to respond to the psychological ploys or be 
more susceptible to coercion, the Fifth Amendment requires that the 
police give Miranda warnings before any answers of that defendant 
can be said to be voluntary. 
D. Conclusion 
Society trusts the government to care for individuals who are ac-
cused and convicted of crimes. With that trust, the government as-
sumes the responsibility for those people's health and welfare, which 
requires it to learn certain information about an individual. That 
need for information, however, is no justification for ignoring long-
standing constitutional principles and basic intrinsic civil rights. 
Courts can ensure that law enforcement officers obtain the basic 
biographical data they need for administrative, record-keeping pur-
poses while still protecting an individual's Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination. First, before applying the routine booking 
question exception to Miranda, the court must require that the ques-
tioning be asked during an actual booking. Second, the questioning 
must seek information only related to basic identification. Third, the 
question must not be reasonably likely to lead to an incriminating re-
sponse. Finally, the police should not be permitted to ask any ques-
tions that they should know are reasonably likely to lead to an 
incriminating response. These basic requirements can help assure 
that all routine questioning of suspects complies with the Fifth 
Amendment. 
